VOL. XXXII, NO. 2 • SPRING, APRIL 1951

THE PERSONALIST

An International Review of Philosophy, Religion, and Literature

EDITORIAL BOARD

RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING, Founder and Editor

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

D. S. Robinson, Current Thought; Merritt M. Thompson, Foreign Exchanges; Review Editors: Wilbur Long, Herbert L. Searles, B. A. G. Fuller, Paul R. Helsel, Sterling M. McMurrin, Louis Wann, Garland Greever, A. Th. Polyzoides, Floyd H. Ross, D. H. Rhoades, Frederick Mayer, Lionel Stevenson

ADVISORY EDITORS

Edgar S. Brightman, Walter G. Muelder, Boston University; William Pepperell Montague, Columbia University; Gordon W. Allport, Harvard University; Richard Hope, University of Pittsburgh; William van Wyck, José A. Franquiz, West Virginia Wesleyan University; Robinson Jeffers, Carmel; N. Lossky, New Haven; Vincent Y. Shih, University of Washington; C. J. Ducasse, Brown University; W. H. Werkmeister, University of Nebraska; Roderick Scott, Olivet College

FOREIGN ADVISORY EDITORS

Andres Avelino, University of Santo Domingo; Charles Baudouin, Geneva; Gaston Berger, University of Marseille et Aix; Etienne Gilson, College de France; Eduardo Garcia Maynez, National University of Mexico; Manuel Regueiro, Universidad Nacional de Litoral, Argentina; Francisco Romero, Buenos Aires; C. C. Hahn, Seoul, Korea; Ph. Kohnstamm, University of Amsterdam

Published Quarterly by

THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles, California

Printed at THE WARD RITCHIE PRESS

Copyright, R. T. FLEWELLING, 1951 Registered U.S. Patent Office

Entered as second-class matter July 3, 1933, at P.O. at L. A.
Under act of March 3, 1879.

Address orders to

FLORENCE H. SMITH, Circulation Secretary

3518 University Ave., Los Angeles 7, Calif.

SINGLE COPIES 50 CENTS : YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION $2.00

Our Contributors' Page

The weakness of our religious concepts, in the view of *The Editor*, has been to place our God in a shrine or in the distant heavens, whereas His real sanctuary is the human heart. So little is this considered that for many the indwelling God has become "*The Unknown God*."

Under the spur of materialistic criticism, critical absolute idealism is often pictured as embodying a dead issue. Director *Robinson* shows the shallowness in much of the opposition and takes up the challenge against Professor Stace and all comers.

In the article *Pragmatism Today* Professor *Searles* notes carefully the distinctive meanings ascribed to the term by Peirce, its originator, and James who filched the expression to give it a new and practical meaning to which were added those of Dewey and Schiller.

Professor *Helsel* in *The Concept of the Person Today* shows how the naturalistic attempt to ignore the interpreting person as an essential part of nature, equally with the medieval concept of persons as logical universals, are inadequate today. "A person is an individual self whose first concern is value," and here lies the most significant fact about reality.

Nat C. Hunnicutt, author of *The Worshiper*, is a new contributor. His book of verse *Seed of the Unknown* was published recently.

Dr. *Stewart*, whose work is generally known through his recent editorship of *Dalhousie Review*, writes an article, *Cudworth, The "Latitude Man,"* which though it celebrates a tercentenary three years past, and which *The Personalist* now pulls from the editorial pouch with apologies, is timely in discussing critical issues. The "dangerous hospitality of mind" entertained by Cudworth and the other Cambridge platonists, is still anathema to those who consider God a respecter of theological opinions, rather than a lover of all who seek him.

Professor *Anna Liddell* of Florida State University discusses the function of mystical intuition which haunts the beginnings of all knowledge and brings even to the scientist "that mystic moment of illumination," which comes when he checks results.

Mr. *Gonzalo* is a minister who faces the perplexities of an eschatology whose symbols are no longer adequate either for reproof or correction. Those who believe that God was in Christ find it difficult to subscribe to the eschatologies of the Greeks and Romans.

The second part of *The Theme of Isolation in Hawthorne* by Professor *Darrel Abel* of Purdue University gives adequate completion to this interesting subject begun in the January number.

Contributions to *The Personalist* do not necessarily express the sentiments of the Editors. In the interest of freedom of discussion views dissident from those of personalism are welcomed if strongly written.

THE PERSONALIST

VOLUME XXXII, NO. 2 SPRING, APRIL 1951

Contents

ARTICLES PAGE

I. "The Unknown God." *Ralph Tyler Flewelling* 117

II. Philosophy Today: Three Views

1. Absolute Idealism. *Daniel S. Robinson* 125
2. Pragmatism Today. *Herbert L. Searles* 137
3. The Concept of the Person Today. *Paul R. Helsel* 153

III. Verse: The Worshiper. *Nat C. Hunnicutt* 162

IV. Ralph Cudworth, the "Latitude Man." *H. L. Stewart* 163

V. Philosophical Mysticism and Modern Science. *Anna F. Liddell* . 172

VI. Changing Eschatological Imageries. *D. F. Gonzalo* 177

VII. The Theme of Isolation in Hawthorne. Part II. *Darrel Abel* . . 182

Notes and Discussions: Charles Hartshorne on Berndtson's "Mystical Experience" 191

Along the Bookshelf 195

From Royce to Heidegger

Royce's Social Infinite: *Smith.* Social Philosophy of Josiah Royce: *Brown.* The Mediaeval Mind: *Taylor.* History of Western European Philosophy: *Alexandrov.* Philosophy for Pleasure: *Hawton.* Religious Perspectives of College Teaching in Philosophy: *Greene.* Outline of a Metaphysics: *Matchette.* Philosophy of Thorstein Veblen: *Daugert.* The Ways of Genius: *Tsanoff.* Recovery of Man: *Barry.* Existence and Being: *Heidegger.*

Basic Issues in Religion

Basic Issues in Christian Thought: *Knudson.* Hindu View of Christ: *Akhilananda.* New Renaissance of the Spirit: *McCrossen.* The Church's Ministry in Our Time: *Sherrill.* Great Awakening in Nova Scotia 1776-1809: *Armstrong.* Tibetan Book of the Dead: *Evans-Wentz.* Ritual Magic: *Butler.* A Free Man's Faith: *Evans.* Commentary on the Creed of Islam: *Elder.* God and Men: *Farmer.* Forgotten Religions: *Ferm,* Ed.

The Interpretation of Literature

Reinterpretation of Victorian Literature: *Baker, Ed.* Permanence of Yeats: *Hall* and *Steinmann, Eds.* James Joyce: *Tindall.* Sixteen Self Sketches: *Shaw.* Days with Bernard Shaw: *Winsten.* Hazlitt Painted by Himself: *Maclean.* Old House at Coate: *Jefferies.* Literature & Theology in Colonial New England: *Murdock.* The Other Casanova: *Nettl.* English Poetry: *Vivante.* Bamboo Flower: *Gonzalez.* Imagery of Keats and Shelley: *Fogle.*

Our Contributors' Page 114

The Lantern of Diogenes. *Plowshares Into Swords* 116

Books Received 222



THE LANTERN OF DIOGENES

PLOWSHARES INTO SWORDS

¶ The gospel of persuasion by force reverses the dictum of peace by demanding that the plowshare shall be beaten into a sword.

¶ Reluctant masses of people, longing for peace, feel daily forced to act against their wills.

¶ To overcome their qualms and objections "iron curtains" are made to shut out the rest of the world so that truth may no longer circulate and lies may grow and grow.

¶ The expediency of falsehood, however, is but to sow to the wind and to reap the whirlwind.

¶ Misstatement provides an insecure base and the higher grows the superstructure of deception, the greater the final disaster.

¶ Eventually the heaped debris of calumny collapses of its own weight, involving its creators in a common destruction.

¶ People are not persuaded by force and measures of force soon become galling to the most intense fanatic.

¶ We need to have a mind these days to the patience of God who waits behind the shadows keeping watch above His own.

¶ The ultimate victory lies with righteousness; the ultimate persuasion with justice and truth.

¶ The world of God, of man, and of nature, the very stars in their courses, fight against the lie.

¶ Civilization needs not only an arm sufficiently strong to beat the sword into a plowshare, but it needs the added strength of being girded about with truth, the integrity of an upright spirit.

¶What we should most fear is the unconscious resort to the measures of our enemies.

¶ This is primarily a spiritual conflict and can be won only on the higher plane of the spirit.

R. T. F.

"The Unknown God"

BY

RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING

THE CONTEMPORARY IMPASSE in civilization is discussed by a distinguished scientist* under the title "How to Live in Two Worlds." The sharp cleavage which daily separates the world into two vast camps with increasing insistency, he attributes to the competition for the allegiance of man between the two great realms of mind and spirit. The world is at present divided in its beliefs respecting the nature of the universe and the nature of man. In this debacle he holds the parties in dispute equally responsible. The arrogance of a dogmatic scientific materialism has been opposed by an equally dogmatic and arrogant idealism. The result of the first has been to destroy the belief in God, and of the other, the belief in man himself. The separated parts of the world can be brought together again only by a common reconciliation on basic principles. Without community of understanding there can be no peace, for the two extremes are forever irreconcilable. "But," he writes, "how bring together communists and Roman Catholics, and adherents of humanism and Protestant fundamentalism?" His response to this dilemma is a personalistic one:

> Each of us also occupies a strategic position *inside* a living being and can thus come into immediate contact with other realities about which science as yet is able to tell us little. From that deep living core within, where matter, energy, and life are so inextricably mingled, there rises into consciousness a throng of emotions, passions, longings, loves,

*Edmund W. Sinnott, *Saturday Review of Literature*, N. Y., Dec. 23, 1950.

> and hates, the whole gamut of inner urgencies that constitute the human *spirit*,

which he declares: "offers access to qualities in the universe not to be gained in any other way." Glimpsing a principle which offers no alternative, yet the achievement of common understanding seems to him manifestly absurd. But the dilemma is far more tragic than that which he presents. Speaking of what must be done by "us," our "us" must now be seen to include the whole world and men of all religions. Difficult as are the barriers between the warring sects of Christendom, they are as nothing to the width of that chasm which divides the larger world, and again that world is so small that continued division portends annihilation. Our "atomic age" has pursued differences and distinctions to the point at which synthesis seems to be almost impossible. When such a point is reached in the experience of the individual he is on the verge at least of insanity, and something like world-insanity seems to have covered the earth. Division and intolerance are not greater than in the past but their effects in the present world are more deadly. Though much has been done to remove them, the situation of our smaller and more communicative world demands more drastic measures. Perhaps it is time to consider more seriously the clue that this author has dropped—to inquire whether this principle which he mentions, and which is common to the experience of every human being, may not suggest a path to follow. We believe that there are basic common concepts natural to all men and applicable in the world of society, politics, and religion.

A Social and Political Principle

The Inviolability of the Person

The inviolability of the human personality is the deepest and most universal sentiment and, at the same time, the basis of democracy. Resentment against invasion of personality seems indeed to be in some degree the possession of many of the higher animals. It is one of the protective instincts necessary to the survival of the living organism.

Even the animals have learned the necessity for the recognition of individual rights. The mockingbird that nests in my tree protects his rights in my yard against invasion. Recognition of the same principle is necessary also to human society, and the only alternative is unceasing warfare. Once the veriest beggar in the congested traffic of Peking, at imminent danger to life and limb, gathered up a contemptuously tossed coin and overtaking the car from which it was flung, cast it with more withering scorn into the face of the ungracious giver. Yet, in this year of grace, knowing the resentment that attends such contempt, we seem not to be conscious of the tragic results that inevitably follow. We continue to magnify differences, and increase contempts with lying propaganda, until common understanding seems unattainable. This spirit has been prominent in our treatment of other races, other nations, other divisions of Christendom, and other religions, till the main problem of our humpty-dumpty world is how to put it together again. We demand for ourselves freedom of opinion, freedom of action, freedom of expression, while in the very act of denying similar freedoms to those who differ with us. At times it seems that only God possesses a tolerance above contempt. Least of all is it the possession of the arrogant materialist, the arrogant ecclesiastic, the fanatic, and the bigot. That contempt which would overcome false ideas without resort to persuasion can only be an assault upon the inner integrity of the person, a sin against man and God. The use of force can only be justified against those who would invade other personalities by force.

Our hope must lie then in the universal possession and recognition of this sense of dignity by every man. Here lies the basis of a common appeal that can be appreciated by learned and ignorant alike. It cannot be arrived at by the violence of war, though war may have to be indulged to protect a decent society against the intolerance of the violent. In the long files of history the violent have never met with ultimate and enduring success; they have perished by their own weapons. In spite of our warped theories about the advance of evolution, progress has not been the reward of conflict but of adaptation

to ever-changing conditions. Appeal must be made to this common instinct of dignity and worth; a new respect for man's faith, his achievements of spiritual value, his endeavors after a better life. However these may be in a given case, they are the foundation on which any future progress must be built. Only on the basis of what he now is, and has, and believes, can something better be built, and only the insight of an appreciative mind can help to build man into new life. We must begin by recognizing every good of which he is now the possessor, and on this erect a higher good. The importance of this fact rests upon the universality of this sentiment of the inviolability of personality as the point of common appeal. No just government can come into being, no government can permanently endure which does not rest on the preservation of the dignity of man.

A Religious Principle

The Sanctity of Personality

The social and political principle involved in the inviolability of personality, the sanctity of personality, is religious in nature. This in turn must be found in the nature of things which depends fundamentally upon the nature and being of God. It is as necessary to ground the spiritual nature of man as it is to account for his physical nature by reference to his physical ancestry. The dichotomy drawn by philosophy and theology between his spiritual and his physical nature has often been so presented as to lead astray. The theologian speaks in one breath of God as creator of the world and in the next comes little short of ascribing all its physical aspects to the Devil. It would seem that a God-created world must have *some* favorable features. The recent revolution in scientific thought here comes in to give unanticipated help, for enlightened science has been forced out of the notion of a mechanistic material universe. The old view is too simple to explain the complexities of existence thrust upon attention by recent scientific discoveries which disclose the naïvete of materialistic theory. Accidental collisions between insensitive atoms, the

exhaustion of the calculus of probabilities, the chance concomitance of particles, are now seen as in no way offering an explanation of operations that take place through time, and involve purposes concerning circumstances and environments not yet existent but only foreseen. Such foresight implies transcendence that could exist only in personality which expresses itself, but is not caught up in or dominated, by its creations. Purposes there are that find residence in gene and chromosome in a way so unseen and unapprehended as to be beyond the reach of materialistic explanation. The existence of the material universe demands God, at least as a Supreme Intelligence, as our most advanced scientists are glad to affirm, among the latest additions to the number being the late Max Planck and Professor Einstein. To admit this is to admit the chief personalistic contention. To doubt or to deny this as a fact is to give up explanation altogether and to confine science to the manipulation of a routine of events which it can make no rational claim to understand. While we may not expect to prove the existence of God by the spatial-temporal measurements of science, the fact remains that science has been driven beyond space and time for the description of reality which calls for a new concept of the universe. Science must either accept the possibility of God or the impossibility of accounting for the world of sense. There is in the world something more than time and space and moving bodies, there is "timing," involving intelligence and purpose as the essential part of living reality. With this fact recognized, the theory of evolution long presumed to do away with the concept of a Creative Intelligence becomes a main argument for faith. God cannot in the light of either sound science or sound theology be conceived in the deistic fashion as an absentee thrusting himself occasionally into the picture of a hostile and ungodly universe, breaking His own laws, in order to manifest Himself miraculously. He must be thought of as a living God and all life as a miracle momentarily dependent upon His creative will. This fact brings to us a deeper appreciation of what the Greek poet saw and the Apostle Paul confirmed: "In Him we live and move and have our being." Such a God is seen as an indwelling

spirit, residing not only in all life but present in the efficient atoms themselves. This constitutes the possibility of an increasingly moral universe as new powers come daily under the control of spiritual beings, the freely willing spirit of man. Herewith a vast new world breaks upon our ken; the world that could be. A new dignity, a new responsibility is placed upon man himself who must yield utterly to the Divine Spirit if he is to fulfil the function to which he was born and for which he came into the world, the full realization of his own personality. He must become a participator with the Creative Intelligence in the building of a new world.

The Neglected Universal

The new researches in biophysics lend themselves ever more strongly to the concept of an indwelling yet transcendent spirit acting in and through the whole realm of nature. It is this spirit which holds creative power in all fields of life and activity, yet it finds clearest expression through the spirit of man himself. And, strange anomaly, this last expression is usually overlooked in the crises that face us. We seek solutions in new organizations of society, new economics, new ventures of social welfare, new education, any of which may be good, but all of which fall short unless they include the loyalty of the spirit itself. The great emergency of the hour is a spiritual emergency, and the battle for peace will ultimately be settled in the realm of the spirit whence eventually all creative forces arise. Our present most glaring need is a grounding of all our action in these deeper spiritual forces. Falsehoods cannot be overthrown by competing falsehoods, injustices by greater or different injustices. Our surest defense is adherence to fundamental righteousness.

This should be our supreme assurance as we seek for some universal formula or formulas which will convince all men and bring a general co-operation for the common welfare. Universal credos, universal forms of government, universal opinions, any of these, however good taken by themselves, can be but external. Professor Sinnott has presented the proper clue—within the spirit of man himself is the

answer. The one point of access to human intelligences on the part of the Divine Creative Spirit is through the spirit of man, and this calls for a great faith where now there is general unbelief. Our confidence in the power of moral conviction is just about nil. Yet in the whole world of experience if we are to discover God we must see him in the lives and activities of our fellow men, in the convictions of our own hearts, in devotion to principles even unto death, in self-forgetting sacrifice, in that Spirit which brings these activities forth in human lives. Here indeed is the visible manifestation of God, if one is discoverable anywhere. The trinitarian too often prating much about this Spirit as the third member of the Godhead, has negated it by refusing to recognize its appearance as God in men, especially in men of opposing creeds; the humanist has forgotten it in an apotheosis of unregenerate human nature divorced from the Universal Spirit, and the atheistic scientist denies its existence altogether. The importance of this is that here lies the one universal and unifying principle, the employment of "the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." The deepest confession of the Man of Nazareth sought to establish forever the identity of this Spirit with the being of God. As such we must look for and recognize it in every struggle of man away from evil and selfishness toward a better life. As in the field of the physical the activities of life must be seen to issue from this creative spirit, so in the life of man it exhibits itself in the dream of liberty, the genius of poet, painter, sculptor, the homely loyalties of the fireside, as well as in the devotion of the martyr to truth. The degree of value in each case depends upon the degree with which the individual yields to the higher call. Here is the Real Presence, which we so often neglect and grieve. We carry about with us every day the incipient shrine which awaits only the proper cleansing and consecration to make it the Shekinah of the Most High God.

Abelard, one of the clearest thinkers of an ancient age, is represented in Remusat's drama as being urged, in his death throes, to make the confession required for absolution but was unable in his convictions to go farther than a prayer to the Paraclete, because to

him the Holy Ghost meant the actual presence of God: the only God that he could know. Here, we may some day come to realize, abides the universal of all true religion which reaches after God and at the same moment approaches the fulfilment of man's highest powers and understanding. We may come to see that this Spirit is the indwelling Purpose in the movements of the Universe; that it is in all and over all, to be seen in the atom, in the sun, moon, and stars, in the silent swing of the galaxies, in the appearance of life, and in the heart of man. Only a pagan conception of God has kept us from seeing this: A parochial God, propitiated to keep his irascibility within bounds, acting only through the shrines we love, the formulas we hold, the beliefs and opinions by which we have gathered something of good, but a God hostile to all other attempts to reach him: this is the paganism of the hour, losing itself in the not too intense worship of "the Unknown God."

Does all this seem but "a tale of little meaning, though the words are strong"? The writer is under no illusion as to the apparent impossibilities. But the hot plowshare of war can bring significant changes in opinions that have remained undisturbed during centuries of peace. Devastating dangers, overwhelming disasters can sift with a certainty unpossessed by peace, the exploiters of humanity from the worshipers and the lovers of man. We shall each be numbered with the one or the other, barriers broken down between men of good will, selfishness uniting the men of ill will. There can be no neutrality. The ultimate advantage will lie with those who co-operate with the all-pervading Spirit of life and not with the destroyers. Our present world appears dedicated to Mars, but as on the Mars Hill of the Apostle, there is a neglected shrine to "the Unknown God." "Whom ye unwittingly worship, Him declare I unto you." And He is possessed with the creative power of all life.

Absolute Idealism Today

BY

DANIEL S. ROBINSON

In discussing absolute idealism as a living philosophy, it is necessary to distinguish two major types. The principle of division required in making this distinction is that of the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Precritical absolute idealism, as it exists today, is what still survives from all the centuries of idealistic speculation before Kant published his *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781. Critical absolute idealism, as it exists today, is that form of idealism which reinterprets Kant's theory of knowledge and critical philosophy as a whole, and constructs a metaphysical system on this foundation.

It should be emphasized that this principle of division does not actually constitute two mutually exclusive types of absolute idealism, because there is a common doctrine that is accepted by representatives of both types. This doctrine has recently been stated well by Professor G. Watts Cunningham. He writes: "There is a common thesis which may be said to be the fundamental thesis of idealism as against its opposite doctrine commonly called 'materialism.' Loosely stated, this thesis is that both ideas and ideals are alike in last analysis fundamental for philosophical construction and not, as materialism holds, derivative and only of secondary importance."[1] The common creed of all absolute idealists is the conviction that meanings in the

[1] *A History of Philosophical Systems*, edited by Vergilius Ferm, p. 315, Philosophical Library (New York, 1950).

logical sense and values in the aesthetical, ethical, and religious sense are objectively and metaphysically real, because they are either grounded in an Absolute Mind, or Spirit, or constitute a spiritual supersensory realm.

The classic systems of precritical absolute idealism have often been reinterpreted and made more consistent with critical absolute idealism. This means that there is a clear line of continuity in the long tradition of absolute idealism. However, we are not here especially interested in these efforts to accommodate earlier to later systems of absolute idealism. On the whole that method of philosophizing which proceeds by accommodating earlier systems of thought to later usually becomes quite meticulous in its application, and the resulting syncretistic system is often tedious and dry. Why not let each succeeding system of absolute idealism stand on its own feet as being peculiarly representative of its age and culture? In any case a classic system that dominated a past age usually outlives what both its disciples and its detractors have to say about it at a later period in the history of philosophy.

Furthermore, each such system is also uniquely and intrinsically valuable *per se*. Perhaps the best name to use to designate the most essential features of all types of precritical absolute idealism is "philosophical mysticism." However, in using this name it is important to exclude theosophical mysticism or occultism. The latter is esoteric. Unprovable claims are made by its originators and promulgated by their disciples, which set these originators apart from the normal run of philosophers by endowing them with special and highly suspect hidden and unique capacities to penetrate into the mysteries of the universe. The very word "metaphysics," when used by advocates of any of the many occult sects, becomes the name for a vast body of wholly speculative and fanciful doctrines, supposedly elaborated by these originators, who claim for themselves superior extra-human capacities for philosophical insight. No technically informed philosopher of any school of philosophy can accept such claims or such doctrines. It is just because they are esoteric and uncritical that theo-

sophical speculations and tenets are not philosophically respectable in academic circles.

Philosophical mysticism has often been, but it need not and should not be, identified with theosophical mysticism, even though representatives of the latter frequently draw upon the writings of the classic representatives of the former in elaborating their speculative lore. Philosophical mysticism is eminently respectable among all informed students of the history of philosophy whether its chief doctrines are accepted or rejected by such students. To take a specific example, no historian of philosophy would think of omitting from a comprehensive history of western philosophy, Plotinus and his system of ideas known as Neo-Platonism, which is certainly one of the supreme classic formulations of philosophical mysticism, but he would not even mention a system of theosophy such as that founded by Madame Blavatsky. Since theosophical mysticism is not philosophically respectable, whereas philosophical mysticism is, nothing more need be said of the former. So we proceed to state quite briefly some essential doctrines that are common to all forms of philosophical mysticism.

That there is an Absolute Spiritual Reality, infinite and ineffable, behind the natural world of our everyday spatio-temporal existence is the central thesis of philosophical mysticism. This realm is eternal, and it is the source of all human good. In his essence, man partakes of the nature of this Absolute Spirit. He is in touch with it in his aesthetic, religious, and moral experiences as well as in his intellectual apprehension of any truth. Even though this Absolute Spirit always eludes every philosopher's complete comprehension, nevertheless all men are in continuous relation with it, for in it every man lives, moves, and has his being. The assertion that there is such a reality, plus the claim that the honest thinker can have intuitive experiences in which his finite mind temporarily coincides and is merged with this Ultimate and Absolute Spirit is what is most unique in philosophical mysticism.

Every student of the history of philosophy knows that such a

philosophy has often appeared and reappeared among men of different races, climates, and times. In the west we need only mention Zenophanes, Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle to indicate a continuous development and enrichment of philosophical idealism of a mystical type among the Greeks before the Christian era. In the east the *Upanishads* and the *Vedanta* among the Hindus, the *Tao-teh-King* among the Chinese, and the Buddhist Nirvana doctrine, that spread all over the Orient, are classic examples of philosophical mysticism that antedate Christianity. Neo-Platonism, the Jewish cabalistic literature, Islamic Sufism, and Christian mysticism, such as that formulated by Meister Eckhart, are classic post-Biblical and pre-modern forms of this type of idealistic philosophy. In close connection with the development of modern mechanical science, Bruno, Spinoza, and others stated it again. In the middle of the twentieth century, no competent critic can deny that this type of absolute idealism is still with us, nor that it constitutes an exceedingly active trend in contemporary philosophy.

To reenforce this statement it will suffice to review briefly the presidential address delivered to the members of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at their annual meeting in December 1949, which was published and distributed to all members of the association in September 1950. In this interesting address Professor W. T. Stace, of Princeton University, attempted to dispose of philosophical mysticism, and in so doing he gave a brief but clear exposition and interpretation of its basic tenets. He recognizes and acknowledges an identity of speech among all philosophical mystics. "For mystics do in fact, in all ages, languages, countries, say *independently* of one another, the same things about the ineffability, the nonrationality, and the supernatural character of what they experience. This identity of speech cannot be explained by the suggestion that they learn it parrot-wise from one another. Mystics within one culture may possibly learn something of the mystic language from one another. But Eckhart never learned from Sankara, nor Sankara from Eckhart. It is obvious that this sort of self-contradictory lan-

guage *breaks out spontaneously* from the mystic almost as inevitably as a scream breaks out from a man in intense agony."[2]

Professor Stace proceeds to elaborate what he means by the self-contradictory concepts of philosophical mysticism, wherever it may thus spontaneously arise, and he rejects all of them severally and *in toto*. Especially does he emphatically deny that there exists any such objective absolute spirit as these concepts are used to designate. Here are some of his wholly dogmatic assertions: "A mind of any sort, however large, good, and powerful, is a natural object, one thing among other things. Moreover the religious consciousness demands that its object be eternal, timeless, and infinite. But no mind can be any of these things. Thoughts and emotions can only be conceived as a stream in time. And such a mind-stream cannot be infinite. For the notion of change which it involves means that an idea or emotion which it has at one time it *lacks* at another. The common phrase 'an infinite mind' is thus a contradiction in terms."[3] Such dogmatic assertions are enough to make a philosophical mystic invoke the shades of Plotinus, Eckhart, Spinoza, and Sankara to reply to them.

Undoubtedly what Professor Stace really means is that the concepts of philosophical mysticism are self-contradictory *when judged from the standpoint of the philosophical naturalism which he defends*, and which is clearly implied in his dogmatic denial of the validity of these concepts. At the very beginning of his address he defines this naturalism as follows: "I will define naturalism as the belief that the world is a single system of things or events every one of which is bound to every other in a network of relations and laws, and that outside this 'natural order' there is nothing. Necessarily therefore naturalism repudiates the existence of any supernatural being or beings, that is, beings falling outside the natural order, and this is the precise point of its conflict with religion."[4] Since the philosophical mystic is not a naturalist in this sense, his assertions are not self-con-

[2] *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 1949-50, vol. XXIII, p. 31.

[3] *Idem.*, p. 35.

[4] *Idem.*, p. 22.

tradictory to him, even though they may be to Professor Stace who is a confessed naturalist. But how can Professor Stace *prove* that the assertions of the propositions essential to naturalism as he defines it are any more true, in the metaphysical sense, than are the assertions of the philosophical mystic about the Absolute Spirit? The answer is that he cannot. Clearly, he is pronouncing the philosophical mystic's concepts self-contradictory from the point of view of his own naturalism. He must know that a philosophical mystic could never possibly believe or assert that reality is "a single system of things or events every one of which is bound to every other in a network of relations and laws," and then at once deny that this system is grounded in an Absolute Spirit. Nor could he ever agree that mind is always something quite transitory and temporal within this system. A philosophical mystic would at least insist on raising the all-important question as to whether the laws and relations which constitute all these things and events a single system might possibly be interpreted as identical with, or as having their ground in, that timeless and eternal spiritual reality which all his concepts are attempting to designate. Certainly Spinoza, who has been called a naturalist, would have no difficulty whatever in making such an interpretation. *Substantia, sive natura, sive Deus*—Substance is that which can be conceived by itself, and can exist by itself. Professor Stace's "single system of things or events" and "mind-stream" can neither exist by itself nor be conceived as existing by itself. Until he can prove that the concepts making up his statement of naturalism are any more self-consistent and any less self-contradictory, than are the concepts used by philosophical mystics to designate the eternal reality on which they believe the spatio-temporal world depends, the essential doctrines of philosophical mysticism will undoubtedly continue to flourish. At least it will take a much better argument than Professor Stace has employed in his presidential address to convince a genuine philosophical mystic. So much for philosophical mysticism. Now let us summarize the major tenets of critical absolute idealism.

The difference between philosophical mysticism and critical ab-

solute idealism has been humorously stated by Professor Charles M. Bakewell in a contrast of Plato and Kant. He writes: "The exuberance of Plato's imagination in describing the gradations of the love bond would make the austere and thrifty old Königsberg bachelor blush to the roots of his old gray wig. This was something he never could understand—and probably a case for the censor." In developing his critical philosophy Kant rejected Plato's love bond and the notion of intuition in the sense of the mystics, and placed definite restrictions upon the speculative use of the human reason. Critical absolute idealism is built upon a general acceptance of this critical point of view. The leading representatives of critical absolute idealism are among the profoundest students of Kant's writings. Consequently no student can even begin to comprehend critical absolute idealism without first gaining a thorough knowledge of Kant's critical philosophy.

This does not mean that absolute idealism accepts Kant's philosophy uncritically. On the contrary the absolute idealists are among the foremost critics of the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, the noumenal and the phenomenal world, the realm of values and the realm of facts. They recognize that pure or theoretical reason cannot be restricted, as Kant wanted to restrict it, to the materials of sense perception. Absolute idealism insists that all of man's experiences are rightly entitled to a hearing when one constructs a philosophical theory. True judgment requires that what is immediately experienced in any way must be related to what is already known about reality. Hence the central doctrine of critical absolute idealism is the assertion that essence as known by conceptual reflective thinking qualifies existence as revealed in any form of human experience.

If we use the familiar distinction between subject and object, critical absolute idealism asserts that these are reciprocally dependent upon each other. Without a subject there could not be an object, and without an object there could not be a subject. Kant said: "Percep-

[5] *Contemporary Idealism in America*, edited by Clifford M. Barrett, The Macmillan Co. (New York, p. 39).

tions without conceptions are blind, and conceptions without perceptions are empty." Critical absolute idealism accepts this Kantian formula and insists that knowledge of reality presupposes that subject and object are so inextricably interwoven as to form a single contextual whole in every act of apprehension. This whole is called by Royce an order system, and by Creighton a concrete universal. It is at once the unit of knowledge and the unit of reality. Unless we assume the identity of subject and object in every genuine act of cognition, we cannot know anything. We should be like the Hindu philosopher who attempted to teach the doctrine of the "fourfold nothingness" of the world: "I am nowhere anything for anybody nor is anybody anywhere anything for me." Critical absolute idealism escapes such utter skepticism by boldly assuming the identity of subject and object within a total experience, from which each may be intellectually abstracted, but which must be thought of in their togetherness and internal relatedness, in every genuine act of cognition. As Professor Cunningham puts it: "What satisfies the intellect is true, and what satisfies the intellect is real" are "distinguishable assertions," but "they are not separable."

In his *Principles of Logic* Bradley gives an appropriate illustration which helps to clarify this conception of knowledge. He writes: "Let us fancy ourselves in total darkness hung over a stream and looking down on it. The stream has no banks, and its current is covered and filled continuously with floating things. Right under our faces is a bright illuminated spot on the water, which ceaselessly widens and narrows its area, and shows us what passes away on the current. And this spot that is light is our now, our present." But, Bradley continues, "We have not only an illuminated place, and the rest of the stream in total darkness. There is a paler light which, both up and down the stream, is shed on what comes before and after our now. And this paler light is the offspring of the present."[7] Here Bradley gives the critical absolute idealist's interpretation of the stream of conscious-

[6] *Loco citato*, p. 320.

[7] Quoted by G. Watts Cunningham, *loco citato*, p. 323.

ness and the specious present. The illuminated spot is the specious present and the objects within it are what is immediately given, but what is in the polar light is inferred, and the ground of inference is the stream with all its floating things. We have here an image or picture of an implicative system, or concrete universal, as the critical absolute idealist conceives it.

This conception of knowledge commits the absolute idealist to a form of the coherence theory of truth. No proposition or judgment, or sentence is significant when taken by itself. Professor Paul Marhenke, in his presidential address before the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in December 1949, wrestles manfully with the problem of the criterion of significance, and draws a paradoxical conclusion. He argues at great length to prove that the criterion of the significance of any sentence is its translatability into another significant sentence. But he also admits that significance is a primitive and an indefinable concept when you undertake to tell what you mean by the significance of the sentence into which other sentences are translated to determine whether they have significance. Professor Marhenke asks this question: "What would it be for the sentence 'The dog lies under the table' to be found true?" And then he replies to his own question: "I can think of only one answer: 'That would be to find the dog lying under the table.'" Using this example as a crucial instance, he then makes this hasty generalization: "If a sentence is true and if I find it true, I can report to you what I found true only by means of a sentence, either by means of the sentence I found true or a synonymous sentence."[8]

The critical absolute idealist escapes from Professor Marhenke's predicament by denying that significance is ever confined within the limits of any single sentence, the meaning of which is primitive and indefinable, or within the limits of any set of synonymous sentences. He contends that the significance, meaning, truth of every judgment is its consistency with the entire system of knowledge so far as that system is involved in the area under consideration. Every

[8] *Loco citato*, p. 17.

sentence gets its meaning from its coherence with a wider system of knowledge. Ultimately every judgment or assertion, positive or negative, must be referred to reality, or to the whole system of knowledge of reality that we possess. And whether we reject it as erroneous or accept it as true is determined by whether it can be fitted into what we already know. To use Professor Marhenke's example: The truth of the sentence "The dog lies under the table" is not constituted by the relatively adventitious fact that he looked under the table and found the dog lying there. It is true, if it is true, because reality is such that the dog was lying under the table when he was looking for him there. In other words, the sentence "The dog lies under the table" expresses a perceptive judgment in which an intelligent percipient qualifies the reality he is perceiving with the concepts "particular dog" and "particular table" and the relational concept "lying."

Summarizing, the critical absolutist contends that every sentence or statement which expresses a judgment, or that is the linguistic form of a judgment is either true or false, because of the wider implicative system within which it falls and of which it is a functioning member. Its consistency with this system is what is meant by its being true, and its inconsistency with it is what is meant by its being false. This is the coherence theory of truth of critical absolute idealism.

Time remains for only a brief statement of another characteristic tenet of critical absolute idealism, namely, the doctrine of the inseparability of value and cognition. The essence of mind is an intellectual activity of which cognizing and valuing are distinguishable but not separable aspects. We know reality and we find value in reality because we are intelligent beings whose minds are capable of participating in and of exploring the recesses of that mind and that perfection sustaining the existence of what we call the universe. Absolute idealism offers to men a metaphysical and spiritual conception of reality which includes the theory that moral laws have their ultimate source in a principle of justice that is neither man-made nor temporal, but which is spiritual and eternal.

To the student who asks the absolute idealist to prove that there is a transcendental realm of perfection, which gives meaning to all finite strivings, the answer is: This is impossible when the question is asked by a skeptic, or by one who is already committed to the naturalistic metaphysics which rejects idealistic metaphysics. But you may find this philosophy to be true if you will reject the naturalistic or skeptical assumptions that cause you to ask for proof. *For these assumptions cannot be proved either.* There is no proof for an ultimate metaphysics. You adopt it as yours because it is demanded by your attempt to comprehend the mind you are and the world your mind encompasses. You reject it because it falls short and omits from its purview what your own intelligence tells you must be included. One is a critical absolute idealist, if he is one, because representatives of other types of philosophy are unable to persuade him that their system can satisfy the insistent demand and urge of his intellect to know the truth that sets him as free as does this philosophy.

Few worse errors can be committed by a student of philosophy than that of dismissing absolute idealism by giving it a historic or classic label. For this practice always means that the distinctive and original insights of this type of thought are closed to his mind. Even though representatives of absolute idealism may themselves use terminology that would explain a student's falling into this error, nevertheless, he can never evade the responsibility of going beyond and behind the language used to the real meaning of the philosopher. Absolute idealism repudiates as a method the selecting of some great classic system, and the refurbishing of its basic concepts in atomic age terminology. Its representatives see no promise in contemporary Thomism, contemporary Spinozism, contemporary Hegelianism, contemporary Kierkegaardianism, or contemporary Marxism. They are all agreed that the pursuit of truth in philosophy requires the student to accept the principle of historical relativity in the sense that each age always has its own distinctive philosophical interpretations based upon a strict attention to and comprehension of the unique experiences and events of that age. Critical absolutists agree

that no historic system can ever be adequately refurbished to satisfy the intellectual curiosity of creative thinkers of a later age. Too often this type of philosophizing is a veiled form of authoritarianism.

If it be objected that critical absolute idealism assumes the Kantian epistemology to be authoritative and binding on all philosophers, and this claim is used to justify taking Spinoza, or Hegel, or Kierkegaard, or Marx, or some other philosopher as the authority instead of accepting the principle of Kantian criticism, there can be only one answer. The principle embodied in the critical philosophy of Kant is an essential methodological postulate for all subsequent philosophical thinking. To ignore this principle is to remain metaphysically naive. To abandon it is to abandon the whole philosophical enterprise. Critical absolute idealism is that form of contemporary philosophy which refuses either to ignore or to abandon the methodological procedure that is essential to the philosophic enterprise. Although it insists on methodological grounds that philosophy can and must be critical in the sense of the Kantian theory of knowledge, it does not exempt Kantian critical philosophy itself from criticism. On the contrary, as has already been emphasized, it demands a radical reconstruction of Kant's philosophy.

There have been distinguished representatives of absolute idealism who have dared to claim finality for the particular philosophical system which they originated. Contemporary absolutists are more modest. They all agree that no human system of thought can ever transcend the necessary limitations of finite minds. Nevertheless, they consider absolute idealism to be the perennial philosophy in the sense that there will always be thinkers who will discover that its basic principles are essential to an adequate interpretation of their total experiences as mature persons. Absolutists are also firmly convinced that absolute idealism is the eternal philosophy in the sense that it is the only philosophical system that proclaims and defends the reality of that eternal and mysterious realm which sustains the visible universe, and without which human existence collapses into the virtually meaningless zero to which atheistic existentialists would reduce it.

Pragmatism Today

BY

HERBERT L. SEARLES

PRAGMATISM is essentially, and even typically, American. Its brief history may be divided into three periods: It had its origin in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Its period of greatest misunderstanding, criticism, clarification, and expansion came in the early decades of the present century. Today it is widely accepted, not so much as a system of thought but as an attitude and method in contemporary science and philosophy.

Philosophy in the United States at the midpoint of the nineteenth century—along with literature, art, and science—was still largely dependent on European models and reflected European ideas. British empiricism, Neo-Kantianism, and Cartesian dualism were widely influential; Hegelian idealism flourished for a time in the St. Louis school; the Scottish realism of "common sense" had gained support in academic circles, while transcendentalism had about run its course as a popular creed. The scientific background in astronomy and physics was Newtonian, and in biology the Darwinian theory of evolutionism was beginning its revolutionary career. There was a great interest in the methods and logic of science. Theism, as expressed in orthodox Christian theology, formed the core of the generally held religious world-view, with minor deviations in the form of deism and Unitarianism. Ethics was in general individualistic and melioristic.

The story of pragmatism is told primarily in the biography, writing, and teaching of four men, although a complete roster of

pragmatist philosophers of eminence would amount to twenty or more. We shall confine our discussion to limited aspects of the work of Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and F. C. S. Schiller. Even this limitation leaves an impossible task since, as is well known, John Dewey alone has been publishing in this field for sixty-eight years. The historian of pragmatism is faced with a difficulty in giving a genetic account of the movement owing to the fact that it first reached the general public through the popular though brilliant writings and lectures of William James; whereas the originator, Charles S. Peirce, published very little during his lifetime and only in such journals as *The Monist*, *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, and *Popular Science Monthly*, which were addressed mostly to specialists. The large bulk of his important work on logic, mathematics, and metaphysics lay unpublished and unread in the Harvard Library until, in 1931-1935, a six-volume edition was brought out by Harvard University Press. The difficulty is increased in view of the fact that these two men had such different interests and abilities and hence divergent convictions as to what constituted the important core and purpose of philosophy as an intellectual and social enterprise, and especially in their interpretation of the new movement of pragmatism which they were bringing to birth.

Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) was the son of the eminent Harvard mathematician, Benjamin Peirce. As a child, he was educated privately by his father, and attended the Lawrence Scientific School. After graduating from Harvard in science, mathematics, and philosophy, he spent most of his active career as a member of the United States Geodetic Survey, although he lectured occasionally at Harvard on logic, mathematics, and pragmatism, and taught logic for a short period at Johns Hopkins University. It was in the meetings of the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge in the seventies attended by Mr. Justice Holmes, Chauncey Wright, St. John Green, Joseph Warner, William James, and sometimes John Fiske and Francis Abbott, where pragmatism took shape as a philosophical method. Of these the most stimulating to Peirce was Chauncey Wright—perhaps

the leading mind of the Metaphysical Club—a mathematician, physicist, and botanist, who was in the habit of drawing a distinction between the use of scientific knowledge to construct a picture of the world, as Herbert Spencer had done, and the use of scientific laws and hypotheses to extend further our knowledge of the world. The latter conception shared by both men seems to have found expression in Peirce's pragmatism.

Concerning one of the meetings of this club Peirce recorded, "I drew up a little paper expressing some of the opinions that I had been urging all along under the name of pragmatism." He took the word "pragmatism" from the Greek *pragmata* meaning "things," which is not to be confused with "*praxis*," meaning "action." He was influenced in his adoption of the name by his study of Kant.

The first published article setting forth the pragmatic principle appeared in *Scientific Monthly* in 1878 entitled, "How to Make our Ideas Clear." Referring to the contrast made by the logicians between "clear" and "confused" ideas, Peirce insisted that it is the function of logic to teach us how to avoid "confused" ideas. There are three levels of clearness: the first is familiarity with an idea, the second is that of precise definition, and the third is the apprehension of the object's practical bearings. The rule for attaining this highest grade of clearness was: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."[1]

For example, the concept "hardness" is meaningfully attributed to a thing if that object cannot be easily scratched by some other substance. The sensible effects, actual or conceived of such operations constitute the whole meaning of the concept. The concept of force, which often has been spoken of as a mysterious entity, is understood when the accelerations of bodies are represented by paths, and then these paths geometrically added.

[1] C. S. Peirce, *Collected Works*, vol. V, p. 2.

The following alternative ways of stating the principle are all from Peirce:

> In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception.[2]
>
> The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.[3]
>
> The rational purport of a word or other expression lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept.[4]

And finally,

> To predicate any term of some object is equivalent to declaring that a certain operation, . . . if performed upon the object, would . . . be followed by a result of a definite general description.[5]

So far we see that the principle of pragmatism is simply a theory of meaning related to Peirce's interest in logic, signs and symbols, and to the experimental method in which he was trained. We shall have no time to mention his outstanding contributions in symbolic logic, semiotic, mathematics, and metaphysics; nor his ambition to work out a complete system of philosophy, "to outline a

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. V, p. 9.
[3] *Ibid.*, vol. V, p. 438.
[4] *Ibid.*, vol. V, p. 412.
[5] *Ibid*, vol. V, p. 483.

theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other departments they may be, shall appear as the filling up of its details."[6]

William James first acknowledged Peirce's tutelage in 1884 in an article "The Function of Cognition" where the first quotation above is given in a footnote. In his 1898 lecture at the University of California, on "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," referring to C. S. Peirce, he said:

> He is one of the most original of contemporary thinkers; and the principle of practicalism—or pragmatism, as he called it, when I first heard him enunciate it at Cambridge in the early '70's—is the clue or compass by following which I find myself more and more confirmed in believing we may keep our feet upon the proper trail.

He quoted the pragmatic maxim from Peirce and then said:

> I should prefer to express Peirce's principle by saying that the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence in our future practical experience, whether active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular, than in the fact that it must be active.[7]

As early as 1878, in an essay "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence" published in *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, we have a foreshadowing of his later views:

> I, for my part, cannot escape the consideration, forced upon me at every turn, that the knower is not simply a mirror floating with no foothold anywhere, and passively reflecting an order that he comes upon and finds simply existing. The knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the truth on one

[6] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 1.

[7] William James, *Collected Essays and Reviews*, pp. 410-12.

> side, whilst on the other he registers the truth which he helps to create. Mental interests, hypotheses, postulates, so far as they are bases for human action—action which to a great extent transforms the world—help to make the truth which they declare.[8]

In this and successive essays and finally in his books *The Will to Believe*, *Pragmatism*, and *The Meaning of Truth*, James extended the principle of Peirce to a theory of truth, at the same time popularizing it. When Peirce saw what was happening to his offspring, he said that James "pushed this method (the pragmatic) to such extremes as must tend to give us pause"[9] that he "transmogrified it into a doctrine of philosophy, some parts of which I highly approve, while other and more prominent parts I regarded, and still [1908] regard as opposed to sound logic."[10]

Writing to James in 1904, he says: "You and Schiller carry pragmatism too far for me."[11]

Speaking at Harvard in 1905 he said of James's use of the word "pragmatism":

> But at present, the word begins to be met with occasionally in the literary journals, where it gets abused in the merciless way that words have to expect when they fall into literary clutches. . . . So then the writer finding his bantling "pragmatism" so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child goodby and relinquish it to its higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word "pragmaticism" which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers.[12]

If it was Peirce who gave pragmatism its intellectual foundation, it was James who gave it a firm psychological background as well as dynamic spirit and personality.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

[9] C. S. Peirce, *Collected Works*, vol. V, p. 3.

[10] *Ibid.*, vol. VI, p. 482.

[11] R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, vol. II, p. 430.

[12] C. S. Peirce, *Collected Works*, vol. V, p. 414.

William James (1842-1910) was educated both in Europe and America. After studying at the Lawrence Scientific School, he graduated from the Harvard Medical School in 1870 and taught at Harvard, first anatomy and physiology, later psychology and philosophy, and finally philosophy alone. As early as 1878 James had contracted with Holt for a work on psychology. Although some of it had been published in *Mind* and other journals, it was nearly twelve years before it was finally published in 1890 in two great volumes. Aside from the pragmatic principle itself, which belongs to theory of knowledge, almost all of the basic concepts of James's later philosophy lie in germ in *The Principles of Psychology*.

Through the concept of the "stream of consciousness" as a continuum he provided a way of avoiding the atomism of the association psychology as well as the rigidity of the Kantian categories. Reference to an "object" in knowing is not to something transcendental beyond experience in terms of either a correspondence theory or a coherence theory of truth, but is a selection within the stream, pertaining to one's own future experience. The keynote of James's psychology was the Darwinian conception of biological utility without any kind of materialism. Mind is teleological and a fighter for ends, not purely cognitive. Knowledge is instrumental in the sense that it does not passively reproduce impressions, but presents us with alternatives from which we select in accord with our interests. I quote from *Psychology: Briefer Course*:

> The chief result of all this modern view is the gradually growing conviction that mental life is primarily teleological; that is to say, that our various ways of feeling and thinking have grown to be what they are because of their utility in shaping our reactions on the outer world. . . . Primarily then, and fundamentally, the mental life is for the sake of action of a preservative sort.[13]

In 1895, he gave an address on "The Will to Believe," later published with other essays under that name. In this he developed a view

[13]William James, *Psychology: Briefer Course*, p. 4.

which has been rejected by many later pragmatists as "voluntaristic." Anything that is proposed for our belief may be called an "hypothesis." A decision between hypotheses is an option. Some options are living, forced, and momentous. When a genuine option cannot be decided solely on intellectual grounds our passional natures not only may but must decide between alternatives.

In the Lowell lectures delivered in Boston in 1906 and later published as *Pragmatism* with the subtitle "A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking," he set forth in detail the meaning of pragmatism as a method and as a theory of truth. Pragmatism is "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts."[14]

As contrasted with the intellectualists' "copy theory" which holds that truth is the *agreement* of our ideas with reality, pragmatism asks the question.

> Grant an idea or belief to be true, what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms? The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we can not.[15]

And further:

> The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons.[16]
>
> "The true" to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole of course.[17]

[14]William James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 54-55.

[15]William James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 200-201.

[16]*Ibid.*, p. 76.

Finally:

> Truth in science is what gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfactions, taste included, but consistency both with previous truth and with novel fact is always the most imperious claimant.[18]

The chief critics of pragmatism were: Absolute idealists in both England and America as well as the new and critical realists chiefly in America. But many of the attacks were directed against straw men, inasmuch as James's attempts to simplify actually produced the opposite result.

The storm of criticism put James on the defensive. Expressing his bewilderment at these misunderstandings, he said:

> These pragmatists destroy all objective standards, critics say, and put foolishness and wisdom on one level. A favorite formula for describing Mr. Schiller's doctrines and mine is that we are persons who think that by saying whatever you find it pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfill every pragmatic requirement. I leave it to you to judge whether this be not an impudent slander.[19]

In spite of this protest, James was conscious of the fact that his language was too loose and popular. In a letter to Hodgson in 1881 regarding one of his addresses he said, "I confess I rather deliberately sacrificed accuracy to effectiveness in its composition—and reaped my reward in much applause."[20]

Again when *The Meaning of Truth* was published, two years after *Pragmatism*, and the reviews had been severe, he attempted to answer his critics in a chapter entitled "The Pragmatist Account of Truth and Its Misunderstanders." He said, "I have to admit in view of

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 222.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 217.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 233.
[20] R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, vol. I, p. 620.

the results, that we have assumed too ready an intelligence, and consequently in many places used a language too slipshod."[21]

In the above-mentioned chapter he tried to meet eight distinct and separate misunderstandings on the part of his critics. These are:

1. That pragmatism is only a reediting of positivism.
2. That it is primarily an appeal to action.
3. That pragmatists cut themselves off from the right to believe in ejective realities.
4. That no pragmatist can be a realist in his epistemology.
5. That what pragmatists say is inconsistent with their saying so.
6. That pragmatism explains not what truth is but only how it is arrived at.
7. That pragmatism ignored the theoretic interest.
8. That pragmatism is shut up to solipsism.

I shall now try to summarize the chief differences between the two founders of pragmatism. They differed in temperament and personality, Peirce being somewhat of an intellectual aristocrat and a recluse socially, whereas James was extremely democratic, with a profound respect for the unique individuality of each person, socially gregarious and much in demand as a popular lecturer.

With respect to their abilities and interests, Peirce was a logician and mathematician, and James a psychologist, humanist, educator and reformer. They differed primarily in their conception of the role and function of philosophy, including pragmatism. For Peirce it was a method of achieving clarity, objectivity, and generality in thought and knowledge. For James philosophy was a function of living, and the pragmatic method made the theory of truth and knowledge practical and applicable in the value-experiences of the individual; hence he tended toward subjectivism. Epistemologically Peirce was a logical realist, having been influenced by a profound study of Duns Scotus, while James was a nominalist of the British empirical school. On many other important issues they were substantially in agreement, such as

[21]William James, *The Meaning of Truth*, pp. 180-181.

tychism, or the belief in chance, pluralism, evolutionism, fallibilism, and experimentalism.

F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937) was well known to us personally, having served as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California from 1929 until his death. Previously he had been tutor and fellow at Corpus Christi College at Oxford. He was educated at Rugby and Balliol and at Cornell University. He called his philosophy "humanism" and tried to get James to substitute it for the more obscure name "pragmatism." James agreed that "pragmatism" was bad, but wrote that it had caught on and that it was too late to change. Concerning Schiller's earliest work *The Riddles of the Sphinx*, published in 1891, James commented that it was "quite in the lines which I incline to tread."[22]

Schiller had been greatly influenced by James's *Psychology*, and I often heard him remark that the most important part of James's philosophy may be found in this work. From it he had adopted the conception of the mind as teleological and instrumental. In 1897 he reviewed *The Will to Believe* enthusiastically and from here on the pragmatist and the humanist became very close friends. Schiller is described by Perry as "the closest and most enthusiastic disciple of James."[23]

Philosophical humanism is an attitude of the human spirit and a method of solving the problems of human knowing. It is concerned with what Schiller liked to call *actual knowing* and *actual judgments*, which in view of the teleological nature of mind, are personal, selective, and purposeful. It undertakes a reform of logic, substituting for the traditional formal logic a new voluntaristic logic, which rejects the taboo put on personal meaning, and seeks to break down the division between psychology and logic, theory and practice. In his "Axioms as Postulates," Schiller took departure from Kant, rejecting the conception in *Critique of Pure Reason* of the *a priori* as universal and necessary forms of the understanding, but accepting Kant's system

[22]R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, Briefer Version, p. 301.

[23]*Ibid.*, p. 301.

of postulation in *Critique of Practical Reason.* Axioms are not self-evident truths imposed by reason, but human acts of will proposed by the scientist to aid in the process of investigation and testing, and always involving the risk of failure. Schiller appealed to the method of verification used in science—which is really the basic meaning of all of the formulations of pragmatism—as the test of a theory by its working. If a scientific theory leads to the observation of facts which confirm it, it is readily inferred that, as the theory "works," it is true.

Just as James had been misunderstood because of his brilliant, concrete and dynamic vocabulary—replete with terms such as "cash-value," "action," "will to believe," "practical," "working," "useful," "consequences," "satisfactions," and "expediency"—so too, Schiller had to contend with his critic's misunderstandings of his volitionally toned vocabulary—employing such terms as "purpose," "selection," "interest," "desires," "values," "working," "useful," "satisfactions."

He wrote in self-defense: ". . . From all truths are 'useful' and 'work' it does not follow that anything useful or anything that works (say a lie) is true. And humanists have never committed this blunder or entertained this delusion."[24]

And again,

> In what sense does humanism make usefulness the criterion of truth? And what are the implications of saying that all truth must be useful? Does it reduce truth to usefulness? Does it follow that anything useful forthwith ranks as true, and, again, that usefulness is solely and completely measured in pounds, shillings, and pence, or rather in dollars and cents? The answer to these questions is—by no means![25]

The following eloquent passage seems to me to sum up Schiller's total viewpoint on voluntaristic humanism:

> Every judgment originates in the matrix of some mind. . . . Consciously or unconsciously it is the product of selection

[24] Muirhead, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 404.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 404.

> from among alternatives which existed for its maker or for others, and so to some extent "arbitrary" or volitional. Every principle similarly is in the end a postulate, *i.e.*, a demand, and not a "law" descriptive of the course of nature. Without principles [postulates], hypotheses [questions], ideals [purposes], and interests [motives] no science can arise or prosper. In short, the nature and course of thinking cannot be understood without taking into account this "psychological" side of judgments.[26]

John Dewey, born in 1859 in Vermont and graduated from the University of Vermont, was one of the first to receive the Ph.D. degree from Johns Hopkins University. Here he was influenced by the Hegelianism of George S. Morris, and was encouraged to write for *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* by its editor W. T. Harris. An account of his philosophical development published in *Contemporary American Philosophy* in 1930, is entitled "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," to indicate the nature of his "drifting" away from absolutism, but he does not deny that this influence has left a permanent deposit on his thinking. In 1894 he was called to the department of philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy at the University of Chicago, where he developed "The Laboratory School" which may be said to mark the beginning of the progressive education movement in America. In 1905 he became Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University where he taught until his retirement. It is well known that every aspect of American culture has felt his influence, not only in the technical aspects of philosophy proper, but in politics, law, education, religion, economics, and the social sciences in general. It will be possible for me to say only a few words about his "instrumentalism" which is the name for his brand of pragmatism.

His instrumentalism is derived from James's *Psychology*, and from the Darwinian theory of evolutionism. Mind has its origin in biological adaptive behavior and is instrumental in enabling the organism to adjust to its environment, and to change, direct, and con-

[26] F. C. S. Schiller, *Formal Logic*, p. 96.

trol it. Thinking begins when the organism faces a problematic situation. Ideas and hypotheses are plans of action for the solution of problems and must be put to the experimental test. For Dewey the consequences, workings and satisfactions to which a theory leads are in no sense subjective or narrowly practical. He welcomed the objective element in James's *Psychology* which had "its roots in the earlier biological conception of the psyche," which in turn led "to the perception of the importance of distinctive social categories, especially communication and participation." On the other hand, he was opposed to the dualism in the *Psychology* which set off a realm of consciousness apart from the environment, because for Dewey consciousness is always consciousness of something. He also rejected a certain subjectivism in the theory of truth and knowledge of his pragmatic predecessors James and Schiller, and found himself much closer to Peirce. It has been an important part of Dewey's life work to correct some of the overenthusiasms in the various expressions of pragmatism, and to remove ambiguities and obscurities in the light of his own growing viewpoint and the criticism of others. It is perhaps unnecessary to remark here that Dewey in his turn has been criticized for his own ambiguities and obscurities.

On truth as satisfaction he said:

> Too often for example, when truth has been thought of as satisfaction it has been thought of as merely emotional satisfaction, a private comfort, a meeting of purely personal need. But the satisfaction in question means a satisfaction of the needs and conditions of the problem out of which the ideas, the purpose and method of action arise[27]

Again in his review of *Pragmatism* he said:

> Since Mr. James has referred to me as saying "truth is what gives satisfaction" [234] I may remark (apart from the fact that I do not think I ever said that truth is what *gives* satisfaction) that I have never identified any satisfaction with the truth of an idea, save that satisfaction which arises when

[27] John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 156.

> the idea as working hypothesis or tentative method is applied to prior existences in such a way as to fulfill what it intends.[28]

Aside from Dewey's contribution to the technical aspect of theory of meaning and knowledge which gave birth to the pragmatic movement, his interest and influence have been great with respect to his interpretation of the function of philosophy. Philosophy is an expression of the culture which gives it birth. It should be sensitive to the values of society, not by way of conformity but by way of leadership in helping to heal the breaches between facts and values, science and morals. Intelligence in the form of the scientific method which has been found so useful in the physical field, should be applied in the social sciences. In revaluating the task of philosophy in 1920 he said: "The task of future philosophy is to clarify men's ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day. Its aim is to become so far as is humanly possible an organ for dealing with these conflicts."[29]

And in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* he said:

> The conception of philosophy reached from a cultural point of view may be summed up by a definition of philosophy as a critique of basic and widely shared belief. For belief, as distinct from special scientific knowledge, always involves a valuation, preferential attachment to special types of objects and courses of action. . . . Thus philosophies are generated and are particularly active in periods of marked social change. . . . The chief role of philosophy is to bring to consciousness, in an intellectualized form, or in the form of problems, the most important shocks and inherent troubles of complex and changing societies, since these have to do with conflicts of value.[30]

The genius of pragmatism (since it is not a system, and certainly not a closed system) is that it has been able to accommodate itself to

[28] John Dewey, "What Pragmatism Means by Practical," *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 5, p. 94, 1908.

[29] John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 26.

[30] John Dewey, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12, p. 124.

and assimilate anything found to fulfil its own pragmatic criteria of tested consequences.

On the purely technical side it has been able, thanks to the pioneer work of Charles S. Peirce, to keep the lead in semiotic and symbolic logic. It has been able to join forces with the logical empiricists in their faith in empiricism, experimentalism and operationism, while agreeing in a lesser degree on the taboo against metaphysics. It has not agreed with them on the extreme dichotomy between cognition and value judgments. Under the leadership of C. I. Lewis it has brought about a mediation between extreme rationalism and extreme empiricism under the name "conceptualistic pragmatism," and George H. Mead of Chicago has extended its social categories to the area of social psychology.

While pragmatism looks forward to the day when scientific methods will be employed in the realm of human values, it acknowledges that at present the world of life and values is richer than that which science reveals. In politics and economics pragmatism has not accepted the unrestricted individualism of a frontier society, but has been able to point the way to a synthesis of extreme individualism and collectivism in ethics and politics as a foundation for a truly democratic society.

The Concept of the Person Today

BY

PAUL R. HELSEL

THE CONCEPT of the person may be considered from one of two points of view: either from what may be learned about the nature of the person or from the treatment through time that the person has been accorded by convention. A thoroughgoing treatment of these alternative views would seem to exhaust the possibilities. Archelaus, a pupil of Anaxagoras and a teacher of Socrates, is credited with being the first to apply in writing the distinction between nature and convention. According to *Diogenes Laertius*, Archelaus said that "what is just and what is base depends not upon nature but upon convention,"[1] and Barker remarks that "it was he [Archelaus] who first drew the famous distinction between *physis* and *nomos* in the world of human affairs."[2] Plato employed the distinction between nature and convention. In *The Republic*, for example, he contrasted the idea of government as derived from "the human natures which are in them [*i.e.*, the citizens],"[3] with the theory that government is "made of oak and rock,"[4] a proverbial expression from the days of Hesiod.[5] Undoubtedly this expression refers to the conventional view that justice in government is nothing but "a mean or compromise, between the best of all, . . . and the worst of all."[6] And finally, no one has applied this distinction to existence more

[1] *Diogenes Laertius*, II, 16.
[2] Ernest Barker, *Greek Political Theory*, p. 53.
[3] Plato, *The Republic*, 544D.
[4] *Loc. cit.*
[5] Hesiod, *Theogony*, 35.
[6] Plato, *The Republic*, 559A.

completely than did Aristotle in the statement that "the limitation by convention was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun or a name."[7]

Aristotle's distinction between nature and convention dramatizes a fact that is generally overlooked in thought today. It calls attention, in the first place, to nature prior to the historical advent of a human agent who was qualified to interpret a meaning. That is to say, that meaning in principle involves a "meaninger"; meaning is the interpretation of a self-conscious interpreter who is capable of predicating a what of a that. It will be argued, of course, that meaning already resides in nature prior to its formulation, but the claim betrays confusion. The supposition that things and events have meaning is an animistic view and is itself already a species of meaning. Brute nature contains nothing of meaning in the form of a what is a that; although nature does contain data which thought stands in need of to enable it to interpret the meaning that it infers, and nature's activity for such an interpretation involves human self-consciousness. Then by the aid of symbols that self-conscious activity explicates the surmises which human perception gleans from the presentations of nature. In the next place, the distinction between nature and convention highlights the contribution which the human mind made to the world after it once appeared on the stage of action; a contribution so effectual as to cause some persons to suppose that interpretations actually reside within brute nature herself.

Again the distinction is useful in the clarification of terms. What does nature signify? The term denotes everything that exists, past and present, excepting man's use of symbols. Also what does the phrase "a noun or a name" express? These terms denote more than mere parts of speech; they symbolize everything which nature is not. What is called nature existed in the past through countless ages without any kind of an accompanying noun or name. When a noun or name was introduced, it had no more effect upon nature than the flight of a bird over the ocean has upon the water. Besides, the introduction of a

[7]Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, 16a27.

noun or a name inaugurated man's learning process which in principle has continued without interruption down until the present time. If this learning process is conceived of as one continuous activity, if it is held to be man's conceptual counterpart of brute nature, an interpretive mirror, as it were, wherein man endeavors to divine the likelinesses of nature, and if man acknowledges that his best efforts at understanding nature consist of the formulation into meaningful symbols of his intimations, surmises and insights about nature both outside and inside himself, if these facts are clearly seen, then it may be understood that all thought, ideas, science, philosophy, culture and civilization, with all that they include, are not themselves things of nature but are nothing more than conventions, mankind's efforts through time at the interpretation of his experience of nature.

Convention is an uncertain area, in that it falls outside of nature and contains unnatural contributions. The character of convention reminds one of Plato's notion of opinions which contain a mixture of what he calls being and nonbeing. Hence Plato thinks that opinions may reside anywhere over the wide range between knowledge on the one hand, and ignorance on the other. Similar to Plato's opinions, the locations of conventions are widespread. Some conventions belong so close to nature that they seem to spring from her and to speak her action, as Plato would say.[8] A case of this is in the physical realm where the law of gravitation seems to articulate the uniformity of nature's behavior. Then at the opposite extreme there are other conventions that thin out into an arbitrary rule of practice. Such conventions are not only alien to nature but also at times they acquire such a prestige as to supersede nature's way for man. Conventions of this kind are in evidence today. In theology, for example, St. Paul's remark that men "by nature are children of wrath,"[9] has been taken to mean that man's original nature is depraved and that therefore he must seek God for a supernatural one. Such a view logically calls for two kinds of nature: one native to the child and another imputed by

[8]Plato, *Cratylus*, 387B.

[9]*Ephesians*, 2:3.

religion. Besides this view claims that the nature that is native to the child should be exchanged for the religious one. Again in government today a conventional theory is abroad which is far removed from human nature. It is the presence of dictatorship which defies the natural theory that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights. From the standpoint then of the character of convention men should be spurred to a critical attitude for the purpose of ascertaining to what extent their views and practices generally are made up of accidental conventions and to what extent they are derived from nature.

Greek thought was man's friend. "From our first view of them [*i.e.*, the Greeks]," Jaeger says, "we find that Man is the center of their thought,"[10] a result that follows logically from the meaning of nature that lies at the foundation of Greek philosophy. That is to say, a correct understanding of nature includes interest in man. If this statement is true, one may then ask of the present-day view of nature if it also includes an interest in man. The answer would be negative and the reason for it springs from our faulty conception. Science and some modern philosophers have taught us that the Greek conception of nature was "the 'stuff' out of which everything is made."[11] This notion of primeval stuff and its naturalistic revision of a single world of things and events,[12] dominated the views of philosophy particularly of the last century with the result that a naturalistic bias now fills the pages of present-day textbooks of the history of philosophy. Thus the Greek conception of nature is misunderstood.[13]

Moreover the conception of the person in the Middle Ages contained no flesh and blood characteristics; it was altogether speculative. This speculative movement was headed particularly by St. Augustine whose thought wiped out the Greek meaning of nature and substi-

[10]Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, xxiii.

[11]John Burnett, *Early Greek Philosophy* (3rd edition), pp. 10-11.

[12]Walter T. Stace, "Naturalism and Religion," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, XXIII, 22, September, 1950.

[13]*Cf.* Wm. A. Heidel, "A Study of the Conception of Nature Among the Pre-Socratics," *Proceedings, American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, XLV, No. 1, August, 1909.

tuted for it a semi-pantheistic conception of a sovereign creator, God, who according to St. Augustine absorbed within himself both nature and man. Thereafter, as De Wulf puts it, "it is not the body that impresses its own image upon the soul by a causal action, but it is the soul [stemming from God] that engenders in itself the image of the body."[14]

When viewed in the light of this speculative movement, the practical value of Boethius' famous definition that the person is "the individual substance of a rational nature,"[15] is diminished. Although the definition is of academic usefulness, dealing logically with terms and relations, it fails to reach down to take account of actual people. Gilson calls it "personality by definition,"[16] a poor grounding of persons who are required to pay taxes, respect controls, and render military service abroad. But during the Middle Ages persons were accorded the treatment of logical universals; persons were abstracted in thought from their bodies, like universals from particulars, and inasmuch as they were thought to be spiritual entities persons deserved spiritual care in order to prepare them for entrance into another world after leaving this one. At the same time this spiritual interest in persons was unmoved by the condition of flesh and blood bodies which it even exploited. Particular concern should be had for the fact that this same doctrine is still vigorous today, watchful of any opportunity of revival. Maritain, for example, declares with apparent approval that "the metaphysical tradition of the West defines person . . . as a reality which, subsisting spiritually, constitutes a universe by itself . . . the concept of personality is not related to matter,"[17] "which, in reality, does not concern the true person."[18] On the assumption of such a premise one should not grieve, for example, over the fallen in battle but should emulate the mood of ancient Tyrtaeus who thought it pleasant "in dreadful warfare to pierce the midriff of a flying

[14]Maurice De Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy*, I, 119.
[15]Boethius, *Contra Eutychen*, III, 4.
[16]Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 202.
[17]Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, p. 30.
[18]*Ibid.*, p. 23.

man."[19] This view affords fertile soil for the growth of totalitarianism. Today we call it communism, traceable in part to a defective view of the nature of the person. Historically something has been neglected out of all proportion to what has been stressed. And J. Edgar Hoover states what he thinks this something is. He says, "the dictator states . . . have renounced . . . deliberately and scornfully . . . the values of Western society . . . which are religion, morality, democracy and the dignity of the individual."[20]

Thus too often the person has been treated throughout time as an idea of convention rather than as an integral part of nature. Nature comprises everything other than convention from the crudest material stuff up through gradational levels including the divine. Also two opposite activities are at work in nature: the immanent and the transcendent. Immanence diffuses itself more and more as it descends from its divine source downward through the levels of human nature, animal nature, vegetable nature, and physical nature where finally it is described as cosmic energy. In the opposite direction transcendence diffuses itself more and more as it ascends from physical nature upward through the levels of vegetable nature, animal nature, and human nature until it fulfils itself in the divine. Moreover these dual activities realize degrees of unity at their respective levels. Soil is immanent in the blade of grass, yet the grass transcends the soil. The physical and vegetable natures are immanent in the animal nature and yet sensuous intelligence transcends them. Human nature too rests upon the foundation of the physical, vegetable and animal natures. Also the unprecedented unity of these dual activities comprises the very essence of human nature and grounds self-consciousness, what we call the I and the me, or the bipolar subject-object relation.

The point of human self-consciousness where these dual activities of nature attain their contrapletion is central in the total scheme of nature. Below this point, on the one hand, the orders of nature may

[19]Tyrtaeus, The Elegaic Poems of, *Elegy and Iambus* (Wm. Heinemann, London), No. 11, p. 23.

[20]J. Edgar Hoover, "Unmasking the Communist Masquerade," *The Educational Forum*, XIV, No. 4, p. 399, May, 1950.

be summed up in the expression "man and the world." If man and the world are divorced from one another they become so loosely related as to carry with them no logical directive as to their method of treatment; they stand the one over against the other, and it seems to be a matter of indifference whether the world is interpreted in terms of man, or man is interpreted in terms of the world. But this indifference allows the place of man and the world to be fixed by accident and not by a rootage in the nature of things. Also above this point, on the other hand, the scheme of nature is knowable only in terms of human self-consciousness. Therefore man's place in nature may be likened to the Roman god Janus with two opposite faces: one face is turned in the direction of man's grounding in nature and the other face in the opposite direction of the aspirations of man's nature.

This strategic place assigned to man by nature constitutes the defense for the personalistic claim that nature's activity of dual unity expressed in human self-consciousness is the matrix of the principle of philosophic interpretation. More than anywhere else in the limitless range of nature the dual unity of self-conscious activity reenacts reality which as Goethe said,

> Call it, then, what thou wilt—
> Call it Bliss! Heart! Love! God!
> I have no name to give it![21]

Steenberghen thinks that "everything which is given as reality is given as an element of consciousness,"[22] and Taylor believes that "it is the reality of our own existence . . . which is our guarantee for the existence . . . of the whole world."[23]

Man's place in nature, therefore, is as fixed by nature herself as any other part of nature could be, but during modern times this fact has not been accepted generally. The testimony of the senses reenforced by the supporting evidence of science has conditioned mod-

[21]Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust*, Scene XVI.

[22]Fernand van Steenberghen, *Epistemology*, p. 84.

[23]A. E. Taylor, "Mind and Nature," *International Journal of Ethics*, XIII, 68, October, 1902.

ern thought with the presupposition that physical nature is of more importance than human nature. This view however misrepresents nature's scheme of things.

But the conception of man's relation to nature is different from that of him as a person. A person does not come into existence at the birth of the body but only by a voluntary achievement. There is a type of political philosophy today that ignores the principle of this fact in that it fails to distinguish qualitatively among the characters of human beings. This political philosophy attempts to quantify mankind in terms of a conventional equality. But Plato believed that by nature there are children of clay, silver, and gold, a view that seems in evidence on every hand today. Academic tests, as well as the practical events of life, screen men according to their natural abilities. Also Plato thought the qualitative distinctions although concealed by nature could be disclosed by the tests of practical life. Therefore he taught the equality of opportunity but never the equality of natural endowment. But today the distinction of natural qualities among men is being rapidly supplanted by a political doctrine that claims that men are a sort of pulverized human stuff. Although one man is larger or smaller than another and may have different color and custom, nevertheless this political philosophy holds that a dialectic of history is working to level off all men in accordance with the idea of one human stuff. In the light of this claim it is understandable how this political philosophy envisages the ideal of a classless state. But human society is an organism of gradational parts and not a pulverization of one basic human stuff. Besides, nature's distinctions cannot be ignored with impunity. Therefore man may be viewed as an individual, a self and a person.

The word "individual" means indivisible or particular and until recently it denoted only physical particles. The term individualism in 1835 sounded "strange . . . to the English ear."[24] Now its use is common notwithstanding the fact that its original meaning of the indi-

[24]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, II, 104, footnote.

visibility of the entire particle still clings to it. Here is the essence of the rugged individualism too long rampant in American democracy and illustrated by Epicurus' view that "there is no such thing as human society; every man is concerned for himself."[25]

The self is discovered in the act of exploring the human individual wherein is found the bipolar arrangement of the I and the me. As has been explained, this locus is where the dual activities of nature attain their contrapletion in the unity of human self-consciousness and supplies the matrix of the principle of philosophic explanation. But even here one has only a bipolar individual self.

Nowhere does the principle of dual unity come to light more vividly than in the person. The person manifests more than the individual or the self, nature's transcending activity. In the complete achievement of the person transcendence actualizes its finite fulfilment and the entire scheme of nature is arranged for its realization. Here the transcending activity goes beyond the limits of physical nature, such as those of space and time with their uniformity and hitherto ascendancy. But the question, does this activity transcend nature herself, requires another question, is nature coterminus with physical nature? Too generally modern thought gives an affirmative answer to this last question, but already issue has been taken with this position. It is held that nature contains successive gradations from physical nature up through vegetable, animal and human natures culminating in the divine nature. When transcending activity then goes beyond the space-time ceiling it realizes itself in a still higher realm of nature, the one of freedom and this realm of freedom is also the one of value. Freedom and value both partake of a common nature and one cannot exist without the other. And as an effect follows a cause in physical nature, likewise in moral nature mankind should recognize that freedom and value historically are parents of human well-being, as Myers says, "the really constructive and regulative forces in history are in truth moral ideas and convictions."[26]

[25]Cyril Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, p. 511.

[26]P. V. N. Myers, *History as Past Ethics*, p. 3.

Today society is coming to scorn human beings who as mere individuals live, accumulate and withhold; more tardily does society disdain human beings who become aware of their selfhood but imagine that the intelligentsia must "think down" upon the common man; whereas the heart of humanity is warmed when value-achieving persons live among them. Who then is a person? A person is an individual self whose first concern is value.

The Worshiper

By Nat C. Hunnicutt

There is a soul, in music, hushed and still;
There is a thing, in melody, unheard;
When every spring, in Arkansas, a bird
Has built his nest behind a lonely hill—
Where spreads a brook into a vale that grows
The dogwood tree—a bird that seems to dwell
With Song's most holy self, and ring a bell
Of very silence sweet as the wild rose.

The Angel-of-the-Swamps! Near dusk and dawn
He flutes a strange, detached, wild roundelay,
As clean and clear as sprinkled skies of May,
And awesome as a life that's come and gone.
The Hermit Thrush, which, modest and alone,
Dreams on the loveliness ineffable,
Dips into rapture till his cup is full
And drinks an ecstasy no man has known.

Ralph Cudworth, The "Latitude Man"

BY

H. L. STEWART

AMONG English philosophic theologians the epithet "broad" has come to distinguish from both "high" and "low." Three hundred years have passed since it originated in the designation of a small group at a Cambridge College as "latitude men." That group came back in thought, to those interested in odds and ends of philosophic development, when there fell recently the three-hundredth anniversary of a famous sermon delivered to Parliament by the most profoundly speculative of contemporary divines, a sermon in which the very spirit of the latitude men was displayed. The preacher was Ralph Cudworth, in St. Margaret's, Westminster, and the date was March 31, 1647.

He was then Master of Clare Hall, Cambridge, and it was a tense moment in the nation's affairs. Two months earlier the Civil War had come definitely to an end, when the Scottish army surrendered the person of King Charles to the insurgent parliamentary leaders. Two years had passed since the Archbishop of Canterbury was beheaded on Tower Hill; two more were yet to pass before the King would be beheaded on the same spot. The members of parliament in that congregation included many varieties of "enthusiast": Calvinist and Arminian, Presbyterian and Independent, High Church Anglican and Puritan Anglican, in mood to anathematize one another. It seemed neither the time nor the place for the lukewarm. Few could be moderate in the fearful struggle only half completed, so as to recognize philosophically "an element of truth and value on each side." The prevailing mood was expressed rather in a favorite Scripture text, one

of the few which many groups, applying it very differently, might enunciate with equal fervor: *Curse ye Meroz, curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof, because they came not to the help of the Lord against the mighty*. A century afterwards, David Hume would say that by the "Meroz" here denounced was meant the party of moderation, always so hated by extremists, but he can scarcely have noted its setting in the *Song of Deborah and Barak*. There was little room for "moderate" policies in Israel's struggle against Midian. And it was to an audience very different from David Hume's readers that Ralph Cudworth had to preach that day in Spring, 1647.

His text was from the First Epistle of St. John: *And hereby do we know that we know Him, if we keep His commandments*. Ignoring the storms of doctrinal controversy which he knew to be fierce among his listeners, Cudworth developed his own grave reflections about character and conduct as the real criterion by which knowledge of God must be judged. He may well have had in mind not merely the ruthless penalties inflicted under the system of Laud upon all dissentients from the orthodoxy of Anglican dogma and ritual, but also the deliberations in the Jerusalem Chamber not far off, where the Westminster Assembly of Divines had agreed upon a new hard-and-fast *Confession of Faith*, to displace the *Thirty-Nine Articles*, and to be enforced no less rigorously. It was opportune for the preacher to give warning at such a time against facile readiness to mistake the wrath of man for the righteousness of God. Cudworth was a diplomatist, as well as a philosopher and a religious teacher; consequently the remonstrance in his sermon was by implication rather than direct, and he received official thanks from the very men he might have expected to exasperate.

Another descriptive name for the group to which he belonged was "Cambridge Platonists." It was given them because their writings seemed meant to rekindle the fires of Platonism after a long stretch of Aristotelian dominance in the English universities. Histories of British philosophy in that middle and later seventeenth century have laid chief stress on Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, but these two did

not by any means exhaust the speculative talent of the time in England. In contrast with them, the Cambridge group was marked by philosophic detachment from the political and social storms of the period. *De Cive*, *Leviathan*, *Treatise of Civil Government*, *Letters of Toleration*—in what atmosphere but that of national insurgence, the Cromwellian Protectorate, the Revolution settlement, could they have appeared? Even as one reads Locke *On the Human Understanding*, or Hobbes *De Corpore*, the surroundings of the writer, the public upheaval dictating at least what questions shall be considered first, must come constantly to mind. How different as one reads certain monographs composed almost simultaneously with these—Whichcote's *Aphorisms*, Culverwel *On the Light of Nature*, Cudworth's *True Intellectual System of the Universe*, Henry More's *Encheiridion*!

It was to the refutation of Thomas Hobbes, the great philosophic unbeliever of seventeenth-century England, that Cudworth devoted most of his energies. Truly a Platonist reply was the one he presented. When we read in *Leviathan* that the "natural" state of mankind is a state of war by all against all, and that no rational person would abstain from pillaging his neighbor's goods if he felt sure either of escaping detection or of being too strong for the victim's resentment, it seems as if the Glaucon and Adeimantus of *Republic II* were reavowing, after two thousand years, their cynical disbelief in virtue. One thinks, too, of Plato's parable about the Ring of Gyges, which gave its wearer the security of being invisible, and of his question whether, if thus guaranteed against being found out, any human being would remain honest. Place *Republic II* and *Leviathan Chapter XIII* side by side, for illustration of the somber thought in *Ecclesiastes*, that speculative activities no less than any other eager exertion are idle vanity, for in them too "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be, and that which is done is that which shall be done, and there is no new thing under the Sun."

But it is no despairing skepticism that is the true moral to be drawn from such repetition, after two thousand years, of the old ar-

gument and the old reply. It should impress one rather with the persisting identity of truth which offers ever the same resistance to those whose caprices would distort it. Cudworth's *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* bristles with feats of analysis and distinction, of dialectic about "right" and "wrong," that would have delighted the author of the *Meno*, the *Protagoras*, the *Philebus*. The sophists of his own period, whom this seventeenth-century Platonist had in mind, were of two sorts; the sort who described the moral contrast as a mere intellectual curiosity of varying human taste, and the sort who no less surely emptied it of objective significance by making it an unintelligible *fiat* of the Most High. Against every analysis of ultimate values which thus rendered them precarious by reducing them to products of a capricious will, whether human or divine, Cudworth reasserted their "eternal and immutable" character, supporting this with copious illustration (exactly after the Platonic model) of the internal incoherences and contradictions in which the argument by moralists of the School of Caprice became involved.

Alarming to some of Cudworth's listeners or readers was a certain liberal tendency he showed, at first sight very different from the ethical conservatism of which I have spoken. The devout in his congregation were startled by his obvious readiness to find in pagan cults some element akin to the Christian revelation. Not for its utter contrast with the products of "unassisted" human reason, achievements of the searching mind of Greek or Roman or Oriental in religious interpretation of life, did this expositor extol the Christian message. Cudworth did not believe that human reason had anywhere been left thus unassisted by the Father of Mankind. It was his delight to show how the originality of the Christian message lay rather in this—that where the ethnic faiths of Confucius, of Buddha, of Mohammed had found only perplexity, it provided an answer; where for them there was but frustrated aspiration, here might be found the way of accomplishment.

He shared in this respect the risk of others of his school. A conspicuous example was the case of Whichcote under the fierce criti-

cism of his friend and former teacher, Anthony Tuckney, Master of Emmanuel. The letters of reproach and vindication which passed between these two cast a flood of light on the significance of the "latitude" group in the seventeenth-century Church of England. On September 7, 1651, in the middle of the Protectorate period, Tuckney had been "much exercised" by a sermon he heard Whichcote preach, and wrote to the preacher that a sense of duty, bidding him hold "the truth of Christ" dearer than his dearest friend, called in such a case for plain dealing. As head of one Cambridge College to the head of another, both alike carrying heavy responsibilities for the training of youth, he must speak his mind. He had "no skill to hide distaste in the guise of a counterfeit smile," wrote the Master of Emmanuel, and for such skill, even if possessed, this would be the worst possible occasion.

What was the matter with the sermon? The irritant to Anthony Tuckney was Whichcote's dangerous hospitality of mind. For five or six years the critic had felt misgiving about a group in Cambridge of which the Provost of King's was the apparent leader, and this sermon had confirmed the dark suspicion. What, he asked, was the meaning of its emphasis on the blamelessness of honest difference of opinion about doctrines of the Faith, and on the scope left for this by lack of clear settlement of certain matters in Scripture? Why did Whichcote so persistently deprecate the framing of explicit creeds and confessions? What else but the ambiguity so favorable to Arminianism could result if his advice were followed, to adhere to the very words of Scripture (which all sections acknowledged alike) rather than attempt dogmatic formulae on which sections were sure to differ? And what of this strange Whichcote Theory of the Atonement—that "it doth not operate on God, but on us"? One can well realize how dark was that heresy to a Calvinist, fresh from the Westminster Assembly which had been working to define with theological exactness just how, under the "Plan of Salvation," the eternally just God had been appeased.

Credit for founding what we now call Comparative Religion in

England, the enquiry whose motive lies in the postulate of a common *nisus* towards religion in all peoples, has often been ascribed to the eighteenth-century Deists. But it belongs no more to Tindal and Collins than to Cudworth and his associates half a century earlier. Perhaps the deists were more original in that they bethought themselves (for they owed little to books) of an enterprise for which Whichcote and Cudworth, Culverwel, and Henry More found not only suggestion but samples of method in Stoic and Neoplatonist philosophy. At least an immediate result of Cudworth's hospitable attitude to the pagans was to bring upon him the suspicion of covert unbelief in the Christianity he had been commissioned to preach. What he recommended as a leveling up was construed as a leveling down. His apparent whittling away of the distinctive Christian things in his message, and his emphasis on whatever could be reinterpreted as Christian in at least the impulse behind some pagan system, were regarded as showing how dangerous the thought of one of these "latitude men" could become. To the reader of our time, acquainted as he was not acquainted with the disclosures of historical anthropology, Cudworth's fault in this matter will appear precisely the opposite of that with which these contemporaries charged him. Not for crafty leveling down, but for naive, uncritical leveling up, do we find his theories in Comparative Religion often incredible, though well meant.

No reproach against him could be more absurd than the insinuation in contemporary church circles that he was of uncertain and wavering theism. Cudworth's whole argument, alike on theory of knowledge and on the foundation of morals, was connected in the closest manner with his doctrine of divine personality. Whether this doctrine was sound, or whether its connections alike with objective knowledge and with an objective ethic are as intimate as he argued them to be, I am not here concerned to discuss. It is Cudworth's philosophic position, not the problem of theism, that in this short paper, prompted by the recent tercentenary, I am seeking to make plain.

In a striking passage of *The True Intellectual System of the Uni-*

verse he argued that certain foundation principles for the thinking of all men, principles incapable of being either proved or doubted, must have been present eternally to the Mind from which finite minds come as an emanation, and that herein lies the source of that uniformity which is the last thing we should expect from the limitless caprice of individual sensations:

> From whence it cometh to pass that all minds, in the several places and ages of the world, have ideas or notions of things exactly alike, and truths indivisibly the same. Truths are not multiplied by the diversity of minds that apprehend them; because they are all but ectypal participations of one and the same original or archetypal mind and truth. As the same face may be reflected in several glasses, and the image of the same Sun may be in a thousand eyes at once beholding it, and one and the same voice may be in a thousand ears listening to it, so when innumerable created minds have the same ideas of things, and understand the same truths, it is but one and the same eternal light that is reflected in them all. . . .

If there was a Platonic model for the theory of knowledge and for the theory of morals urged by the Cambridge group, Platonic inspiration for the manner in which it connected these two theories is still more obvious. Constantly Whichcote and Cudworth emphasize, in language either quoted from Plotinus or breathing the very spirit of the *Enneades,* that discipline of character is a prerequisite for insight into the meaning of things, and that the remedy for many a philosophical breakdown is likelier to come through cultivation of the habits of the saint than through elaboration of logical subtlety. They would remind readers or listeners sometimes in scriptural phrase about what is hidden from the wise and prudent, but revealed to babes; about that sight of God which is reserved for the pure in heart; about the doing of the divine will by which one comes to "know of the doctrine." At other times, and with the same significance, they would recall the warning of St. Augustine that salvation was never promised through perfecting of man's dialectic instrument,

and the central principle of the Neoplatonists about the mystic as a supplement to the argumentative life; the "rapture" and "ecstasy" in which, for Plotinus as for St. Paul, things "not lawful for a man to utter" were made known to the devout.

Restoration England was no propitious soil for the spread of ideas such as these, any more than for the poetry of Milton or the allegories of Bunyan. But Cudworth, who had kept his intellectual composure amid the storms of the Great Rebellion, was not likely to be distracted by the excitements of the royalist reaction. It strikes one indeed as an unearthly detachment he had shown in the writings of his early days, about which Martineau has well said that they might more naturally have been produced in some remote and silent monastic retreat than "amid the rage of factions and the reverberation of the Naseby guns." Nor during the thirty-four years of his College Mastership (1654-1688) did he turn aside in his voluminous writing on speculative philosophy to tell us what he thought on the issues of popular conflict—about the claims and counter-claims of army and parliament in the last years of the Protectorate, about the intrigues of Charles II with Louis XIV, about *habeas corpus*, about the plot of James II to undo the work of the English Reformers.

Not merely from social and political, but also from church disputes of the period did the latitude men keep studiously aloof. Their desire was to be mediators, and they were prepared for the usual risk which attends that thankless office. The storm of the Reformation had raged long on the continent of Europe—in Saxony, in Switzerland, in France—before it began to be felt with real intensity in England. But in English much more sharply than in continental communities the Reformed Church became itself split into antagonistic groups, accusing each other alternately of superstition and of license. The latitude men, true to their name, regarded a Puritan such as Richard Baxter and a sacerdotalist such as William Laud alike with a sympathy which neither Laud nor Baxter could have felt towards the other. They did not (at least so far as their writings show) take any part in those immediate church controversies, always so violent in

temper, often so trivial in issue. Whether there can be a valid ministry without diocesan bishops, whether the altar must be placed against the east wall and cannot without impiety be placed in the center of the choir, whether not only the period of worship but the whole of Sunday must be kept in aloofness from ordinary concerns and relaxations of "the world," whether days named after saints and observed with feelings of devout memory regarding the gifts and graces of "mere men" are an infringement of the rights of a "jealous God"—these are topics the Cambridge men avoided.

Was such intellectual isolation, on matters about which excitement was so general, to be expected in Platonists? Plato indeed had said that the philosopher must at times re-enter the cave, but disputes of the sort I have cited did not seem to them to call for philosophic intervention. They may well have had in mind Plato's own futile interference in the politics of Dionysius of Syracuse, and have noted in the situation of contemporary England some of those circumstances which, in the Sicily of two thousand years before, made philosophic meddling do more harm than good. It was at least the notable service of the group neither "high" nor "low" but "broad" to keep before the minds of a discerning minority in the England of that troubled time that the essence of religion is deeper than any which can be reduced to terms of either denominational or party-political difference.

Philosophical Mysticism and Modern Science

BY

ANNA FORBES LIDDELL

If modern critics are likely to rule out mysticism as unscientific, so too in the Middle Ages schoolmen rejected it as unorthodox. Both objections are essentially the same: immediate certainty transcends the limits of logical thinking, deductive as well as inductive. The ghost will not be laid; it walks the length of our philosophical history from Pythagoras to Montague; modern naturalists have succeeded no more than Ionian physicists in exorcising this troublesome spirit.

Although mystics take high place among the saints, they are but grudgingly admitted to the company of scholars. Immediate certainty of experiencing truth, which is the quality of mysticism, is not a judgment but an intuition. Spontaneous, immediate acceptance of experience: it rises from no premise; it depends upon no authority. Mysticism is the act of realization; it has no critical method; with embarrassing suddenness it swallows whole.

Consequently, while the mystic enjoys unshakable certainty, he is vulnerable to critical attack. Medieval schoolmen feared mysticism as tending toward, if not actually tainted with, heresy. Inner vision might not only transcend but actually contradict orthodox teaching. In any case, if realization of truth could be attained directly in a moment of illumination, the authority of the church was weakened. Yet, since orthodox teachings rest finally upon revelation, to deny the validity of all mystic experience were to destroy the foundation

of the church. The beatific visions of the saints were occasions of ineffable joy to the beholders, but of extreme discomfiture to ecclesiastical officials. They claimed authoritative right to evaluate the known results of mystic experiences and determine whether or not they conformed to the tradition of the church. In the thirteenth century the revelations to St. Paul had long been accepted without question, but the mysticism of Thomas Aquinas made him slightly suspect to his own generation, although eventually he was canonized, and his teachings became the standard of Catholic orthodoxy.

In modern times mysticism is not likely to be regarded with fear, but with ridicule. Those who profess that any affirmation of truth must be the result of a logical process, objectively demonstrable at every step, dismiss all claims of intuitive certainty as absurd. With amazing disregard of their own critical standards, they are likely to lump together: crystal-gazing, clairvoyance, and the spiritual insight of Plotinus or St. Bonaventura. If clairvoyants and crystal-gazers be classed with philosophical mystics, should not astrologers, palmists, and phrenologists be included among the scientists?

The fact that mysticism has not critical method does not preclude the application of critical judgment to the outcome of mystic experiences. Medieval churchmen recognized that; many modern scholars fail to. Scientists will admit that their own inferential judgment is not essentially different from that of so-called common sense; scientific exactitude is obtained by delimiting the conditions under which inference may be drawn. So too, the philosophical mystic does not deny that the act of immediate realization, or mystic intuition synthetizes whatever experience is given. If the content of mystical intuition is to have philosophical value, the conditions determining that experience must be as carefully and critically examined and tested as they would be in a case of scientific experimentation. Although the moment of illumination is a pure intellection of truth, subjective, unique, sometimes incommunicable, the moment comes only after discursive reason has reached the limit of its potentiality. It comes not to rebuke nor even to correct the efforts of reason, but

to crown its final success. The light breaks upon those who have striven hardest in the severe discipline of logical thought. In the moment of insight the results of previous labor are not cast aside as useless, but established as true. In Brahmanism, Buddhism, Sufism, Neoplatonism, and Christianity it is requisite that a philosophical mystic shall have passed through a period of rigorous intellectual preparation. Not everyone who labors diligently in the field of science (using *science* here in the broad sense of the German *Wissenschaft*) will necessarily attain an original insight into truth, but no one dares hope for illumination if his mind be unprepared. The philosophical mystic must first be, in his own field, a scientist.

In Nicholas of Cusa, that fifteenth-century cardinal whose philosophy makes the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, we find the adequate example. As a mathematician and physical scientist he was far in advance of his times. Without undertaking to set forth his whole mystic philosophy, but using the basic principles and procedures laid down in the first few chapters of *De Docta Ignorantia* (Heidelberg, 1932), the writer will try to show what philosophical mysticism is, and also that pure intellection is not a superficial adjunct, but an integral factor in the process of thought, as necessary to science as to religion.

Experience begins with bare acceptance of events without questioning whether they are true—what Santayana has described, in a happy phrase, as "animal faith." Such acceptance without conscious interpretation is not complete mystical experience, but since it is direct, positive, intuitive grasp of the whole, it is at least the limiting case. When intelligence raises the question "Is experience true," and continues with the demand "I must find out," mysticism and science have appeared. To say "Is it true?" involves the implication that truth is discoverable. Both Descartes and St. Augustine before him thought that the unanswered question provided occasion for intuitive affirmation of the existence of truth. Nicholas of Cusa does not make so great a claim. Like Socrates, he knows surely only that he knows nothing. Philosophically speaking, this is his first conscious act of

realization. What he intuits is his own ignorance. Through reflection he is led to conclude that ignorance is a relative term carrying with it the hope of knowledge. Knowledge is a measure of truth. The first insight is barren of content; it is simple awareness of the unlimited Unknown. The second insight recognizes the necessity of mediation, the principle of measure.

It is the nature of human intellect to persist in the effort to know. The process of learning advances step by step from what has been accepted as known to the still undefined. There must be a starting point. Nicholas accepted as the beginning of knowledge "that from which no sane, free intellect is able to dissent." This point of universal agreement is both the admission of ignorance and the fact of thinking. Obviously it becomes the problem of thought to investigate the nature of its own ignorance. This is more than word-play. As intelligence interprets the data of experience it defines terms and relations, but this involves affirmation of the infinite and absolute. *Definite* has no meaning apart from *infinite*. The next act of realization is the apprehension of the infinite as the ground of the finite. In so far as intellect acquires any knowledge of the finite, the finite is known in relation to the infinite. Even *being* implies the unlimited correlative *not being*, or *being* is meaningless. Pure intellection rises to a great height in realizing that the absolute, as absolute, both is and is not, containing all contradiction within itself, it cannot be added to, for it already extends through the infinite range of possible addition; it cannot be subtracted from, for how could anything be taken away? It is already the greatest and the least, and so the actual one which makes possible all finite units of measure.

In the writer's undergraduate days it was a current joke among students that philosophy dealt with the abstract absurdity, "How high is up?" Years later, to her joyous surprise, she discovered that Nicholas of Cusa actually had put the same question (he states it in terms of how long is long, but the question is essentially the same) and that, far from being absurd, it is an important philosophical problem. Using his argument, though not his illustration, let us say that

one foot up is one foot up and a million light years up is a million light years up. Continue on through incalculable distance; subtract whatever distance has been designated, and what remains is *up*. It is the most that can be or the least than can be in order to be *up*. But *up* is a consistent quality, a definite direction. Subtract that and what remains is simple absolute unity in which the greatest and the least coincide.

At the level of thought which Nicholas calls that of imagination this is merely a little game. Pass on to the higher level of reason and it may seem to be a rather stupid game. Rise with him to the highest level, pure intellection, and it is revealed as a profound statement. No comparative standards can be determined except with reference to the pure truth of measure, and the pure truth of measure is the immeasurable, unlimited or self-limited one.

The writer once became involved with a professor of chemistry in a discussion about the nature of reality. With the air of coming right down to solid earth the chemist remarked, "I like to base my conclusions on something I can weigh and measure." "How," she was asked, "do you account for the concept of weights and measures?" She went back to her laboratory without making any reply.

It is the contention of this paper that Nicholas of Cusa gives the answer. In its process science depends upon intuition for the first establishment of standards of measure, as in the beginning it received through intuition that hope of truth which started curiosity on the path of discovery. It cannot be said of science *in the end*, for science has no end. Every achievement opens up new problems, but when the individual scientist has checked his results and they appear as verified, does he not then enjoy the mystic moment of illumination, the ineffable satisfaction of having attained the truth?

Changing Eschatological Imageries*

BY

D. F. GONZALO

RELIGION is a general term. It covers a field of sentiments and feelings of fears and hopes respecting spirits, demigods, gods, or God. God, as man can know Him, is a complimentation of impingement and imputation. But in His reality *per se* He is infinitely more than what He impinges upon man and what man imputes to Him.

Man in his solitude, as when he was a lone hunter and a dweller in caves, felt impinged by the nights and days which seemed to watch over him with a thousand and one eyes, and this aroused his fears and hopes. When he and his kind began to live and hunt together, then the seeds of ethics and morality sprouted. But the roots of these were his ideas of what was "good," and the "good" had always something to do with what he conceived as favored by the gods, or God.

Religion is instinctive with man, and history in its entirety may be understood as man's adjustment to his changing insight of God. Egypt sensed the futurity of an Elysian life in God, and as its people lived in the ancient aura of that belief, Egyptian culture became characterized by eternal tombs. The Assyro-Chaldaeans felt that God was best known as an administrator through the administration of the state, and so proceeded to apotheosize the state. But man is corruptible even when he plays god as he runs the state, and so the symbolic monuments of the Assyro-Chaldaic culture remain to be Nineveh and Babylon, and the tower of Babel, which may well represent the high conceit of man.

*From the writer's introduction to his *Thoughts and Meditations.*

On the other hand, in ancient Judea man knew God to be holy, majestic, and just, and as we look back to the Hebraic culture we think of the Holy Ark of the Covenant, the Holy of Holies, of the prophets, the Psalms, of the Ten Commandments. Ancient Greece caught the vision of abstract truth, beauty, and goodness in God, and as the vision lasted it produced for man the most imposing array of philosophers, made beauty concrete through art, and brought Plato who wrote a theory of the good life in his *Republic*.

Change is the vital mood of history, and that change is due to man's change in his sense of values. Those values, we remember, have something to do with his changing understanding of God.

Man has changed in his imageries of Heaven and Hell. What he imaged half-believing and half-suspicious fifty years ago of these, he now has thrown overboard mentally. He is still religious as he always will be; but unable to subscribe sincerely to the old imageries, he has become indifferent to, or at best he supports the church but with mental reservations. Thus he is a house divided against itself. Thus he gives the church an emaciated semblance of life.

The change of these imageries was initiated two yesterdays of history ago ("a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past") when it pleased God to walk with man as a man and reveal Himself and His will. Rome at that time had become the sole and official funnel through which flowed the blended cultures of the world. When at last she adopted Christianity as the state religion, she dressed the young Christianity, so to say, in the pageantry and imagery to which she fell as heir of the pagan past.

But the Christ came in order that man might grope no longer for the true meaning of God, as far as man may know Him, in terms of human values and in his reach into the divine. The words of the Christ as He talked to man on the Mount, in the Upper Room, in His friends' home—or wherever man was—became the undertones and overtones of man's christianized thoughts, and as the centuries rolled by they took him farther out of his pagan imageries.

It will suffice to mention three important factors which brought

man to his present religious concepts. First is the march of general information. This has made man see that what he has been taking for granted as "Christian" imageries are not very "Christian," for they have been adopted from the Egyptian imageries of the Elysian fields of their souls, and the counterpart of those fields—the dark and doleful corridors of worms and serpents which were imaged to live upon the bodies of men and women, and feed upon their blood, etc., etc. Two opposite places these, where two opposite kinds of souls were to be sent after death. Or, more recently, they root in the rich imagination of Socrates as depicted by Plato, but later embellished by the pagano-Roman-Christian world.

Our Lord, in emphasizing the life after death, now and then used the same imagery—for its currency at the time—by referring to a "furnace of fire" where the hypocrites are to be sent. But the burden of His teaching on the subject is that Heaven is to be in tune with, and to be in, the heavenly Father, and Hell is to be cut asunder from God and thrown out into the outer darkness. The emphasis is on *separation* from God, who is the source of our being and the home of our spirits.

The doctrine of *separation* has not been given the proper emphasis down the past centuries, for in them man lived, as it were, beneath the candlestick that held the light. But as man moves out into the direct rays of the light of the world—which is the Christ—he sees the shadow beneath the living light and understands why, necessarily, he had to have the old imageries while, and as long as, he was in that circumscribed semi-light.

Still, even today, many "wonderful" Christians are yet unable to take Him at His words without reservations although He said: "I proceeded forth and came from God. . . . I came from the Father and am come into the world. . . . He that hath seen me hath seen the Father. . . . I am in my Father and the Father is in me. . . . I and the Father are one."

By general information man now conceives of distances in terms of billions of light years, and has knowledge of microparticles and

microwaves, and of vibrations and intensities undreamed of by him while the old imageries were still useful in his spiritual development. But now he finds that even to the farthest ends of his "yardsticks" of knowledge he cannot detect any indication of the places to which the imageries might correspond.

If there were such places, no matter how remote or distant they would be, they would posit an existence other than that of God's, and that would constitute a *limit* to God about whom the mind may not postulate a limit of that kind. And if such were conditions instead of places, then psychology, though such a small body of knowledge as yet should constitute an arc, infinitesimal though it be, by which the whole circle may be plotted. But psychological knowledge at this time points only to the contrary which is that all emotional experiences, no matter how intense they may be, can last only so long and no longer, thus affirming experience, and attesting the spirit of the hymn:

> He will not forever chide us,
> Nor keep anger in his mind,
> Hath not dealt as we offended,
> Nor rewarded as we sinned.

Justice, according to our earthly ways, is to mete out to everyone as he deserves. The Christ did not teach this "a tooth for a tooth" justice, but the "turn the other cheek also," "give also thy cloak," "go with him twain" kind. Man, in the light of this, cannot now believe the kind of justice involved in the old imageries.

The second factor is the march of democracy, a value which is possible only because of the teachings of the Christ. But had man understood from the beginning of his "Christian" era that the Christ is very God, applied democracy would be far more enlightened even now. But even as it is, it has developed for man the belief that personality is man's most fundamental value. Such a belief impels the individual to a self-realization as a *person* in God, accountable to his own integrity and to God. Such a freedom-predicated soul builds

institutions of freedom. Creative freedom in man compels him so to do.

The third factor in the change of our eschatological imageries is the development and broad application of jurisprudence throughout the Christian world. Applied jurisprudence has made ambiguous and near-obsolete the meaning of the term "sin." We now live in the midst of what used to be sins. The "law" has taken these over and turned them into "crimes," so that the murderers, thieves, fornicators, etc., are no longer "sinners," but "violators of law," and after they have "paid their debt to society," for all practical purposes and the taxpayers' money, that is the end of that. "Sins" today are no more alarming than "bad," and "bad" is something "not so good," and "not so good" is "not so bad," and if not so bad, then it will pass.

Other factors may be mentioned. They all point, however, to the fact that religious imageries change with the change of man's understanding. If man were less tenacious, and nostalgic in holding to his traditional imageries, and acknowledging his concepts of God as brought up to date through his tools of knowledge, the impinged truth and light from God through the Christ, he would cease to be the house divided against itself. Religion—the church—would come to its own as man's natural climate of the spiritual.

The Theme of Isolation in Hawthorne

BY

DARREL ABEL

PART TWO
IMBALANCE

SUCH TALES as have been considered in the earlier sections of this study deal with the *total* inability of human creatures to become "beings of reality." Most of Hawthorne's remaining tales investigate the condition of creatures who are innately or actively unbalanced: who fail for various reasons to animate the *whole* range of their faculties and sensibilities.

a. One-sided Endowment

One of the ways in which man, an earthen jug with spirit in him, might be morally interesting, was by being fashioned awry—entering the world with a disproportion between his earthiness and his spirit. Such unfortunately defective individuals are unable to achieve full participation, moral and physical, in the human community, and are usually painfully aware that they are missing part of the life lived by better-balanced persons.

Characters in whom earthiness overbalances spirituality are numerous in Hawthorne's fictions, although they are never his central characters, because they have too little infusion of spirituality to be morally interesting; they are presented as foils to characters who do have spiritual natures, or as graphic embodiments of the earthy *half* of human nature—not so much the representations of persons, as the representations of qualities, somewhat in the fashion of characters in the medieval morality plays.

Such overplus of earthiness, being a congenital defect of persons, is a misfortune rather than a censurable fault. Moral compassion, not moral condemnation, is directed toward such characters as Old Stony Phiz in "The Great Stone Face," from whose countenance "sublimity and stateliness, the grand expression of divine sympathy . . . had been originally left out, or had departed."[60] Another such unfortunate was Robert Danforth, "a rude man of earth and iron," of whom Owen Warland, the Artist of the Beautiful, declared: "His hard, brute force darkens and confuses the spiritual element within me."[61] Hawthorne's dislike of such unspiritual life of the senses accounts for his unfavorable portrait of the Old Inspector in the Salem Custom House: "He had no soul, no heart, no mind; nothing but instincts."[62] The same horror of brutalized humanity led him to utter shocked comment on the diseased, dull-witted workhouse brats he saw in England during his consulship:

> It would be a blessing . . . if every one of them could be drowned tonight, instead of being put to bed. If there be a spark of God's life in them, this seems the only chance of preserving it.[63]

Judge Pyncheon in *The House of the Seven Gables*, a man "unctuous, rather than spiritual," is a more complex specimen of this variety of the human species: "The Judge prided himself on eschewing all airy matter, and never mistaking a shadow for a substance."[64] But he had enough awareness of spiritual and moral realities and obligations, which he chose to dishonor, to be a morally responsible—and reprehensible—person.

There are also many characters in Hawthorne's fictions who have too little earthiness. Many of these are children, usually of frail

[60] *The Snow-Image*, p. 430.

[61] "The Artist of the Beautiful," *Mosses*, p. 511.

[62] *The Scarlet Letter*, p. 34.

[63] *English Notebooks by Nathaniel Hawthorne*, ed. Randall Stewart (New York, 1941), p. 277.

[64] *Seven Gables*, p. 143.

physique. A principle of compensation is evident in these: the less body, the more spirit, and *vice-versa.* Children of this character, who possessed a "depth of insight that grown people lacked,"[65] are Ilbrahim, the battered title-character of "The Gentle Boy"; Annie, in "Little Annie's Ramble"; little Joe, in "Ethan Brand"; the little boy in "The Ambitious Guest" who has a premonition of the slide; Pansie, in *The Dolliver Romance;* and Ned and Elsie, in *Doctor Grimshawe's Secret.*

Women, because of their frailer physical make, are more likely than men to be overspiritual. This trait of the sex, universally observed in Hawthorne's delineation of the feminine character, is most evidently illustrated in Priscilla in *The Blithedale Romance,* "the weakly Maiden, whose tremulous nerves endow her with Sibylline attributes,"[66] and who has "spiritual intimations respecting matters which are dark to us grosser people."[67]

b. Perversion of Faculty

Although all human sensibilities and faculties are good when rightly used, it is possible to "pervert best things to worst abuse." A passionate life of the senses is good so long as its satisfactions are a link between carnal and spiritual life, but it becomes bad when it is lived for *merely* carnal satisfaction and displaces soul as center of man's sinful earth. Passion is a bond of community, but sense abused can be an isolating kind of experience which leads the sensualist to regard the rest of creation, including other persons, as mere methods of excitement. Hawthorne's erring heroines—Hester, Zenobia, and Miriam—are his most striking fictional illustrations of how passion can become an engrossing principle of life; all are voluptuous women of robust constitution whose upstart passions for a time tragically obscure their abundant spirituality.

Among the tales, "John Inglefield's Thanksgiving" is Haw-

[65] *Doctor Grimshawe's Secret,* p. 15.

[66] *The Blithedale Romance,* p. 323.

[67] *Ibid.,* p. 482.

thorne's most extended treatment of the theme that abandonment to a sensual life irredeemably isolates the errant individual from spiritual community with his fellows, that "Evil habits and carnal vices . . . unspiritualize man's nature and clog up his avenues of communication with the better life."[68] The moral capability of Prudence Inglefield, the guilty sensualist, is emphasized: she is compared with her innocent younger sister ("the rosebud that had grown on the same stem with the castaway") to enforce the fact that she had been endowed with all the qualities necessary for pure spiritual life, and is therefore morally responsible. When she returns on the evening of Thanksgiving Day to spend a short while with her family after an absence of some months of living in sin, she falls for a brief time tranquilly into her old place in the pure affections of the domestic circle. At the hour of prayer, however, she rises to go, and cannot be restrained. Despite her father's solemn adjuration to stay and bear his blessing or go bearing his curse, she is compelled to leave the sacred affections concentrated in the circle of the family hearth:

> The same dark power that drew Prudence Inglefield from her father's hearth—the same in its nature, though heightened then to a dread necessity—would snatch a guilty soul from the gate of heaven, and make its sin and its punishment alike eternal.[69]

More perilous to the soul even than the aberrations of the passions, because more consciously and inveterately preferred to a spiritual life, is reliance on the intellect alone as a sufficient instrument of knowledge and purveyor of good to men. Like the sense, the intellect belongs to the finite part of man and serves him primarily in establishing rapport with the physical world. It is a cognizing faculty which should serve an attaching faculty, love. If it is egotistically used, the sympathies and intuitions, organs of man's spiritual nature, are denied their function, and spiritual life dies with their lack of exercise.

[68] "P's Correspondence," *Mosses*, p. 409.

[69] *The Snow-Image*, p. 590.

Whereas Hawthorne's women furnish his best illustrations of spirituality extinguished by overintellectuality, Hawthorne's most subtle and complete study of overintellectuality is his analytical history of Roger Chillingworth's degeneration in *The Scarlet Letter*. Coverdale, Holgrave, and Kenyon (in *The Blithedale Romance*, *The House of the Seven Gables*, and *The Marble Faun*, respectively) are all men in whom there is "a cold intellectual tendency," but fortunately they are aware of it as a peril if too much indulged, and by making it serve altruistic and loving purposes, they remain sympathetic characters. Several of Hawthorne's most consummate tales deal with gifted men whose "moral nature had ceased to keep the pace of improvement" with their intellectual development, with the result that their hearts "ceased to partake of the universal throb," and they lost their hold of "the magnetic chain of humanity."[70] "Rappaccini's Daughter," "The Prophetic Pictures," and "Ethan Brand" are Hawthorne's most remarkable treatments of this theme among the tales.

It is possible of course for a person to lose touch with human community because he becomes too much absorbed in a vision of spiritual life; that is, he can pursue an intuitional life to the detriment of his sensible, rational existence. Such perversion, or unbalanced exercise of faculties, was not, in Hawthorne's judgment, sinful so much as it was sad. The person practicing it was not spiritually lost; he was simply a loss to mankind.

c. Contention of Faculties

Hawthorne's most frequent treatment of imbalance is neither about one-sided endowment nor about perversion of faculties, but is about faculties at war with each other rather than technically co-operative "throughout the whole range." This can be adequately illustrated by two stories which exactly complement each other: "The Birthmark" and "The Snow-Image."

[70] "Ethan Brand," *The Snow-Image*, p. 495. See R. H. Fogle's "The Problem of Allegory in Hawthorne's *Ethan Brand*," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, XVII (January, 1948), 190-203.

"The Birthmark" shows how a woman who is as near to the ideal as any real woman can be, "the best the earth could offer," dies because her too-idealistic husband refines away the materiality that connects her with humankind on its earthy side, so that she becomes all spirit. The husband, Aylmer, "an eminent proficient in every branch of natural philosophy," partly exemplifies man's meddling intellect, but his central trait is the marked spirituality of his aspirations: he presumes, rather than aspires, to a knowledge and control of spiritual mysteries. He trusts his mundane learning and scientific skill to bring about materially a perfection that his insight enables him to conceive ideally: intellectual presumption which is in fact an effort to usurp partially the creative function of Deity. He represents the too-spiritually inclined man, relying too much upon mundane power and knowledge.

The earthy part of man is typified in his helper Aminadab:

> With his vast strength, his shaggy hair, his smoky aspect, and the indescribable earthiness that incrusted him, he seemed to represent man's physical nature.[71]

Aylmer's wife Georgiana is only a little less a symbol and more a character than these two. Although she is a merely passive character in the story, while they are active and purposeful, she represents desirable actuality—the highest perfection of mingled earth and spirit —whereas Aylmer and Amindab represent the two parts of man's nature divided and opposed in intent, though technically co-operative.

Aylmer's love of science is so great that it can brook no rivalry; instead of preventing his loving Georgiana, it perverts his love, so that he regards his wife, not as a sacred and mysterious vessel of spirit, but as an object of scientific experiment. He forms the daring design of improving upon God's best handiwork by removing the birthmark which symbolizes "the fatal flaw of humanity which Nature . . . stamps ineffaceably upon all her productions."[72] He succeeds too

[71] *Mosses*, p. 55. Aylmer calls him a "human machine," "man of clay," "clod," "earthly mass," etc.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

well, by refining her out of earthly existence. The moral is that man should not contemn and seek to evade the "earthly imperfection" which is a necessary condition of human existence, but should accept it and make it consonant with his spiritual portion.

"The Snow-Image" is a contrasting treatment of the theme that earth and spirit in man should not contend, but should harmonize with one another. Mr. Lindsey, who like Aylmer works ill where he intends good, is opposite to Aylmer in his conception of reality. Aylmer aims at the spiritualization of matter; Lindsey, at the materialization of spirit. Lindsey is a materialistic but not selfish or evil "an excellent but exceedingly matter-of-fact sort of man, a dealer in hardware, . . . sturdily accustomed to take what is called the common-sense view of all matters."[73]

His wife, on the other hand, possessed imagination and insight:

> [Her] character had a strain of poetry in it, a trait of unworldly beauty . . .[74]
>
> All through her life she had kept her heart full of childlike simplicity and faith, which was as pure and clear as crystal; and, looking at all matters through this transparent medium, she sometimes saw truths so profound that other people laughed at them as nonsense and absurdity.[75]

This oddly matched pair has two children, Violet and Pansy, whose childish faith endows with life a snow-maiden they have made and gives it an animation corresponding to their vivid ideas. The common-sensible father insists, despite the remonstrances of his wife and children, upon bringing this purely ideal creature into the house to warm herself by the fire, which of course soon dissolves the cold tenuity of her material substance and her ideal existence with it.

> This, you will observe, was one of those rare cases, which yet will occasionally happen, where common-sense finds itself at fault. . . . After all, there is no teaching anything to

[73] *The Snow-Image*, p. 391.

[74] *Ibid.*

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 406.

> wise men of good Mr. Lindsey's stamp. They know everything. . . . And, should some phenomenon of nature or providence transcend their system, they will not recognize it, even if it come to pass under their very noses.[76]

Thus Hawthorne illustrated variously how tragedy occurs when man's earthly and spiritual parts are not both duly accommodated. He prefers to treat abnormal deviations from balanced life to demonstrate his thesis, probably because only the study of aberration can show the punishment of aberration and recommend the wisdom of balance. Extreme deviation was fortunately exceptional: Hawthorne thought that ordinary men possessed a sufficient infusion of spirit, though a surplus of earth was the commonest kind of unbalance. He thought that common humanity constituted a kind of reservoir of spirit which was an inlet of the infinite environing ocean of spirit; with this, each normally endowed person could communicate through sympathy, even though denied insight to penetrate directly to the source of spiritual truth. Thus all men had access to a fund of wisdom infinitely more reliable than any individual's could be:

> When an uninstructed multitude attempts to see with its eyes, it is exceedingly apt to be deceived. When, however, it forms its judgment, as it usually does, on the intuitions of its great and warm heart, the conclusions thus attained are often so profound and unerring as to possess the character of truths supernaturally revealed.[77]

This belief in popular sentiment, not popular intelligence, as a revelation of truth, was the real basis of Hawthorne's fervent trust in democracy. He believed that one man or a few men would be liable to err, as human reason in individuals is liable to err; but that a government representative of popular feeling was divinely guided: the voice of the people is the voice of God. Thus he attributed Franklin Pierce's nomination to the presidential candidacy to

[76] *Ibid.*, pp. 411-412.

[77] *The Scarlet Letter*, p. 155.

> the marvellous and mystic influence of character, in regard to which the judgment of the people is so seldom found erroneous, and which conveys the perception of itself through some medium higher and deeper than the intellect.[78]

And of Lincoln's granite integrity, he remarked: "The people have that intuition of it which is never deceived."[79]

The faculty which he was thus willing to attribute to mankind collectively, of intuitions more reliable than sensible observation and rational judgment, he did not hesitate to ascribe likewise to uninstructed and unintellectual individuals: "The earthliest human soul has an infinite spiritual capacity, and may contain the better world within its depths."[80] It is not to be supposed, however, that he ever had a complacent belief in the *natural* goodness of men; he believed all men capable of good, but also of evil—and in fact recognized a terrible inclination in men to prefer an immediate and seductive evil to a remote and ideal good.

The basic problem of the moral individual, as Hawthorne conceived it, was, on the one hand, to build a distinct ethical self without turning all his faculties inward and becoming a mere worshiper of his own ego; and, on the other hand, to open himself to the vital influences which could come to him only through his relations with other persons and with nature, without relinquishing so much of his precious individuality that he would become a human cipher. Life becomes too speculative for the contemplative man, too absorbing for the active man. A person's moral existence depends upon his maintaining a delicate balance between the real and the ideal, self and society.

[78] *Franklin Pierce*, p. 435.

[79] "Chiefly About War Matters," *Works*, XII, 313.

[80] "The Old Manse," *Mosses*, p. 16. See also *ibid.*, pp. 239, 503; *American Notebooks*, p. 148.

Notes and Discussions

ARTHUR BERNDTSON ON MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

A recent fine article in this journal[1] gives a challenging criticism of the cognitive claims of mystical intuition. I wish to express some disagreement with the main argument of the article, without denying the many merits of the latter.

First, the author seems to think, though perhaps here I misunderstand, that intuition *might* intuit nothing, might fail to have an object with its own "independent" reality. One may hold, on the contrary, to the view that intuition is having, and that you cannot have and have nothing, or nothing but the having itself. In other words, the notion of a mere phenomenon may be meaningless. And, as has often been held, no intuition as such is illusory. If the intuited qualities of the mirage are not in the desert, they are in the bodily process which, rather than the desert, is the primary content of our sensory intuition. Interpretation is already at work in the feeling that there is an oasis out there. Interpretation must interpret something, and intuition is the name for our having of this something as open to interpretation. If there is no independent content of the mystic intuition, then there is no mystic intuition, but only mystic interpretation. Of what? Of our own love, or of love in the abstract, seems to be the author's answer. We shall come to this. Here I only wish to say that even then the love would be independent of the intuition, which might have the form of immediate memory of a preceding act of love that did not intuit itself but the loved one.

It follows from the foregoing that all intuition is in a sense true, and there is no opposing possibility of error. Truth here does not imply the possibility of error but only of ignorance, of not-intuiting the object. The given might not have been given, at least not in the same way or in just this intuition. In no case would there be error, apart from interpretation, but in every case in which there is intuition there is truth, not indeed in the sense in which symbols are true, but in the sense in which truth of signs is a secondary, substitute form of the having of reality as it is. Sign-truth is sought *faute de mieux*. If all were intuited, no one would want truth of signs. He would have all truth in superior form.

This is an answer to the author's closing discussion of the ideal of cognition. I should hold that the ideal of cognition is to form the best approximation to the ideal of love that is possible to mere cognition, *i.e.*, to truth through signs. Detachment is not, then, an end in itself, but a means of protecting ourselves from *exclusive* attachments. To have versatility of attachment, participation, or love, we must not too intensely love any one thing. But the ideal is universal participation, not nonparticipation. True, the contemplator wishes to preserve his own identity. But this does not conflict with participation. For awareness is a synthesis of data, not a confusion with them. The synthesis is not

[1] *The Personalist*, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, pp. 272-288.

the data. It includes them and has them, has their life and value, but it is an enjoyment of their enjoyment, not just their enjoyment. This only repeats what was said above about the aim of partial detachment. The aim is to give us a greater range of data slightly participated in, rather than a few more richly possessed. This is all our adaptation to our human limitations, not an absolute ideal. Love is the ideal of *all* our activities.

The ideal of love is either an interpretation of something other than love, or of an intuitive datum which is love itself. This is either our own act of love, or an essence of love in Santayana's Realm of Essence, or it is a love not simply our own nor a mere essence. The mystic thinks it is divine love, intuited by him. Does Professor Berndtson refute this claim in his admirably well-stated and careful argument? He relies, in my opinion, rather crucially upon certain metaphysical ambiguities which have, to be sure, baffled most of the theologians and mystics themselves. He thinks the divine love as independent of us could only be the One as that from which the many are derived, but which itself is wholly underived and simple. Now I think metaphysics has somewhat outgrown the stage at which Plotinus and many others lingered. There are many forms of Oneness, of unity. There is the question of a primordial, wholly nonderivative aspect of divinity, and of a consequent or derivative aspect. The former alone is simple, the latter is the most complex of all realities. Neither, in my opinion, is in every sense ineffable. It is, however, impossible that both should be known to us in just the same sense and fashion. If we had an intuition, of more than infinitesimal adequacy, of the consequent state of God we should be omniscient without having to use symbols. (I cannot see that "clarity" depends on symbols, which are rather designed to atone so far as they can for the narrow scope of our more distinct intuitions.) So the mystic cannot intuit God in his consequent richness, unless with negligible vividness and distinctness, useless for purposes of introspective reading off of items intuited. But since the primordial aspect of God pervades all the phases of the consequent, the failure to intuit details of the latter need not render negligible the intuition of the common essence. This is simply the generic trait of love common to all possible acts of God. It is divine lovingness, not any one act with this quality. This lovingness does not contain or imply any particular divine acts or any particular state of the many, the world. It is indeed a fountain from which they proceed. It is not true, I think, that we have no understanding of the creative power of love, even ordinary love. I cannot admit that we are not able to connect the one of divine love with the many. We can feel such love as inspiring ourselves, and to inspire is to create. We are made by inspiration so far as we are made at all. In a sense we make ourselves, as Sartre and Whitehead have said, but we use the data at hand. This means we make our own synthesis of the life about us. The antecedent state of divine life is the inclusive datum for this synthesis. Our intuition is negligible in vividness so far as most consequent details of the divine life are concerned. Our synthesis includes its datum in radically deficient manner, so that "inclusion" does not have a simple literal meaning here. Only the divine love literally includes its data with all their values, effectively possessed.

Indeed, human love is never literal in a simple sense. We hate and are indifferent to the very persons we love.

Very likely this is quite inadequate as an answer to Berndtson's subtle reasoning, but it may indicate why one might disagree with his view that just human love can ever be divine, or that which we have in intuitive grasp in the experience of God. Also, why one might disagree with the idea that knowledge has its own ideal, ultimately separable from love. If the ideal of knowing is to make the object of service to us, rather than of serving the object, then Dewey's great ideal of the convergence of intelligence and practical goodness is indeed out of place. But to know the living and suffering and enjoying is to take upon ourselves the problem of its welfare. Yet just because our secondary form of knowing can delude itself with notions of independence, can take discursive thought, or some other secondary good, as a sufficient end in itself, it is only theologically valid in the literal sense that intelligence and goodness wholly coincide. They do so because the real value of knowledge is contained in that of love. This value is the enjoyment of communion and participation, is self-achievement through taking the wills of others into our own will—*i.e.*, love.[2] There is no item of knowledge that cannot contribute to this, and there is no reality not knowable in a sufficiently adequate form of participation. Such at any rate follows from the mystic intuition. Is not our critic really assuming the denial of this message in his arguments against its validity?

University of Chicago CHARLES HARTSHORNE

* * *

ROYCE TO BRIGHTMAN

When he was serving on the faculty of Nebraska Wesleyan University, Professor Edgar S. Brightman wrote a letter to Professor Josiah Royce, commenting on *The Problem of Christianity* (2 vols.), published by The Macmillan Company in 1913, and inquiring about Royce's relation to Borden Parker Bowne. In a letter written at his home, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge Massachusetts, and dated July 16, 1913, a little more than three years before his death, Professor Royce replied. This letter has been treasured by Professor Brightman through the intervening years. It is printed below in full with the permission of Professor Brightman, and Mr. Stephen Royce, of Crystal Falls, Michigan, son of Professor Royce.

D. S. ROBINSON

Dear Professor Brightman,

I thank you for your kind letter of July 13, and, in particular, for your reference to Deissmann's two monographs, which I have not seen. I am, of course, no theologian, in any technical sense, and I make no attempt to keep up with New Testament literature. But both your references help me; and I shall hope to use them in future.

[2]This seems to be the main theme of A. Stern's lucid article in the issue of *The Personalist* already referred to. Where I have said participation, Stern says "overcoming the opposition of subject and object." But the idea seems much the same.

I wish that somebody would tell me what my precise relation to Bowne is. I suppose that our agreements were rather on the increase towards the end of his work. I always prized him much; but each of us had many irons in the fire. I ought to have come closer to him before he left us.

Yours sincerely,
Josiah Royce

* * *

OUR MENTAL SLIP WAS SHOWING

One of our most-prized subscribers has written in to inform us of a mistake which passed all proofreaders in the January *Personalist*. The name of Protagoras and the famous First Fragment "Man is the Measure" must have been mentioned and clearly assigned in *The Personalist* a hundred times during the thirty years of its existence. This time it was assigned mistakenly to Heraclitus. Our correspondent, however, made a slip too because he informed us it should be assigned to Pythagoras.

Along the Bookshelf

FROM ROYCE TO HEIDEGGER

ROYCE'S SOCIAL INFINITE—THE COMMUNITY OF INTERPRETATION. By *John E. Smith*. Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1950. Pp. xiii-176. $2.75.

Professor Hoernlé wrote: "To any young American student of philosophy who rejects Absolute Idealism I would say that he has no right to dissent or condemn, unless he has first earned that right by a thorough study and understanding of Royce." This is a strong, but true statement. The neglect of Royce by the graduate students of philosophy in this country since his death is regrettable. Eventually he is sure to come into his own, because he is undoubtedly the outstanding American abolute idealist of our national history.

Professor Smith says that three important and valuable parts of Royce's philosophy have been insufficiently treated. "These are: the theory of the community of interpretation, the debt to Charles Peirce's thought, particularly his logic, and finally the interpretation of Christianity." (Preface, xi) His aim in writing this book was to expound and to evaluate these three aspects of Royce's thought. Here are his chapter headings: I. The Idea of Infinite Community; II. The Background: Peirce's Thought and the Philosophy of Loyalty; III. Community Interpretation as Infinite System; IV. The Problem of Christianity; V. The Beloved Community; and VI. The Great Community.

A short bibliography represents addenda to the bibliography of Benjamin Rand in *The Philosophical Review*, Volume XXV, No. 3, May 1916. However, even with these addenda, the bibliography is still incomplete. Rand missed some important items, and Professor Smith did not find all of them, and he missed some items that have been published since 1916. For example, he does not mention the valuable letters and other comments of Royce included in Professor R. B. Perry's *Thought and Character of William James*.

Professor Smith published this book too soon. His references to Royce's writings show that he has not covered several important items that throw light on the subjects he discusses, and to which he should have given close consideration. Especially is this true of Royce's California writings, and of his contributions to Hasting's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

In spite of these limitations Professor Smith is on the right track in his interpretation of Royce. He has given an excellent analysis of *The Problem of Christianity*, (2 vols.), and he is quite right in emphasizing the importance of this mature presentation of Royce's conception of the community. In the opinion of the reviewer he exaggerates the influence of Peirce on Royce's thought, but it would be a mistake to minimize it, and Professor Smith does point out wherein Royce went beyond Peirce. His book shows that he has penetrated into the depths of Royce's philosophy, and has found there enough philosophical wisdom to enable him properly to place and to evaluate logical positivism.

It is to be hoped that Professor Smith will utilize the knowledge he has acquired of Royce's thought to explore more completely the rich legacy he bequeathed to our American philosophical literature. While this treatise is a significant contribution, the author should continue his research, and produce another and a better book.

D. S. Robinson

The Social Philosophy of Josiah Royce. Edited with an introduction by *Stuart Gerry Brown*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1950. Pp. 220. $3.00.

Professor Brown is unquestionably right when he says that Josiah Royce's social philosophy "contains a core of wisdom which is capable . . . of serving as a rich source of insight to the student of society and morals at the present day." He is certainly wrong when he says that this social philosophy "is capable of standing independent of his metaphysical preconceptions." (4) Royce's philosophy is an integrated whole, and his social philosophy is deeply rooted in his logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. Professor Brown criticizes Royce for giving an absolutistic explanation of the "community of interpretation" which, he writes, "I have omitted since I do not myself accept it." (27) Imagine Royce omitting something because he did not accept it! He would have considered himself obligated to state a view he did not accept as clearly as one he did accept. But Professor Brown can hardly be expected to write a full exposition of Royce's social philosophy in an introduction of twenty-nine pages, and he has rendered a real service in compiling these readings from four of the philosopher's practical treatises. From *Race Questions, Provincialism and Other American Problems* (1908) Professor Brown has selected "Race Questions and Prejudices" and "Provincialism"; and from *War and Insurance* (1914) he has taken Royce's "Address on War and Insurance." Five selections are drawn from *Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908): (i) "The Nature and Need of Loyalty"; (ii) "Individualism"; (iii) "Loyalty to Loyalty"; (iv) "Conscience"; and (v) "Some American Problems in Their Relation to Loyalty." Two selections are taken from *The Hope of the Great Community* (1916)—one the same as the title of that book, and the other "The Possibility of International Insurance."

Since all four of the books from which these selections are drawn are now out of print, this book will be especially welcomed by teachers who wish to put some of Royce's own writings into the hands of their students. Unfortunately the book does not have an index.

D. S. R.

The Mediaeval Mind. By *Henry Osborn Taylor*. 4th ed. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1949. Vol. I: pp. xix-603; Vol. II: pp. viii-620. $10.00.

For nearly forty years Taylor's *The Mediaeval Mind* has been a leading classic in its field, the history and appreciation of the thought of the Middle Ages. The present impression is the fifth of the fourth edition, having been a part of the author's bequest to Harvard College. Moreover, though it has so long held the

field, it is not likely soon to be superseded. To the contemporary reader it bears the same interest and freshness as ever though so much has since been written on the period, and Coulton with his voluminous writings has hardly been surpassed. Taylor's great gift lies not alone in the correctness of his historical information but also in a human philosophical and religious insight of special value to the interpreter of men, measures, and movements.

To the reviewer, especially interested in the story of Abelard, Taylor's description of Abelard's character, ambitions, and achievements has hardly been exceeded by such interesting accounts as that of Helen Waddell, or Lloyd's *Stricken Lute*. A similar insight appears in the treatment of other characters throughout the work making it an inevitable need for every humanistic library. Though many writers assail the subjects here presented from many angles and with the growing advantage of late discoveries, there is no danger that the information here gathered will be outmoded.

The Harvard University Press has conferred a real benefit in the field of culture in the venture of reprinting a work that is already present in so many libraries. It would be a misfortune to have these volumes out of print.

R. T. F.

A History of Western European Philosophy. By *G. F. Alexandrov.* Yale Institute of International Studies, New Haven, 1949. Pp. iii-399.

This is the famous and most controversial book published in the Soviet Union on the history of western European philosophy by a man who only five years ago was the leading exponent of this subject. This volume was accepted by the Ministry of Higher Education in the Soviet Union as an official textbook in the colleges and universities of the U.S.S.R. and a second edition of the work was issued in 1946 under the imprint of the Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Shortly afterward, with the changing tides of communist doctrines, the hand of the Soviet state fell heavily on the author and the book, both being accused of "anti-Marxist deviations," "bourgeois opportunism," and all the other intellectual crimes as listed in the communist jargon of the Kremlin. As a result of this the book was suppressed after thousands of copies had already been in circulation and the author was called to account. By recanting his former "unorthodox" views and by making full amends, he was restored to official favor after writing a short volume on "The Pattern of Soviet Democracy."

What we now have before us is the second edition of this work where the author, in a more or less elementary style, is trying to cover a huge field of philosophic history and thought from classical Greek times to Marxism, Leninism-Stalinism. Curiously enough in a volume of four hundred pages, the eighth and last chapter, covering the rise of Marxist philosophy, covers less than forty pages, mostly because, presumably, in the previous chapters Marxist dialectics and comment have been brought into contrast with the various evolutionary periods of European philosophical progress. Even so, the author has given less attention to Marx than to his predecessors and that may be one of the reasons

why he was singled out by the Central Communist Party as more inclined to study western thought, than to pay the proper homage to the Bolshevik state religion of Marxism. As a matter of fact, the indictment stated that Alexandrov had failed to carry through the principle that philosophy is inevitably partisan. However, for a subject so vast as the history of western European philosophy, the author has written a rather short and compact volume, the chapters of which are uneven and often muddled, and very elementary. It is certainly no small feat to prove that Epicurus, Aristotle, Democritus, and other ancient philosophers were the original Bolsheviks and it is equally interesting to note that the author dismisses some other exponents of philosophical thought with short references and paragraphs. Equally condensed is the chapter of "The Philosophy of the Feudal Age" where patristic philosophy, for one thing, is summarily dismissed with only a superficial examination of its tenets. The Renaissance and the French revolutionary era get somewhat better treatment and the same could be said of the founding of modern philosophy in Britain, Holland, France, and so on. The book gives the impression of having been written in haste and of trying to cover too much ground in a limited space. Thus what we essentially have here is more of a handbook on philosophy rather than a volume that goes deeper into fundamentals; perhaps to do so would have meant Siberia or worse for Alexandrov. That he was let off after a mere recantation of his theories, interpretations, and beliefs, should be taken as evidence that his book was not too bad an exposition of bourgeois thinking in the midst of communist Russia.

A. Th. Polyzoides

Philosophy for Pleasure. By *Hector Hawton*. Philosophical Library, New York, 1949. Pp. x-214. $3.75.

This little book, *Philosophy for Pleasure*, is well named. From Thales to Whitehead in two hundred pages, the author has hit the high spots in the history of philosophy and, by means of a very ingenious selection, has managed to deal with a great many of the perennial problems of philosophy, albeit briefly in most cases. It is the kind of book one would like to put into the hands of the layman interested in a short survey of what philosophy is all about. Somewhat close fidelity to original texts and care in definition of terms prevent the book from becoming an overpopularization of the subject.

H. L. Searles

Religious Perspectives of College Teaching in Philosophy. By *Theodore M. Greene*. Edward W. Hazen Foundation, New Haven, 1950. Pp. 45.

This is the fourth in a series of pamphlets that deserve wide circulation. The three earlier ones dealt with the relation of religion to the fields of English literature, history, and economics. In this brief essay Professor Greene of Yale University states clearly and thoughtfully a position which he thinks will not be "congenial or convincing to the dogmatically anti-religious philosophy or

the dogmatically anti-rational believer." Philosophy he describes as "characteristically an intellectual pursuit," religion "a distinctive type of experience and a way of life." In his view they are properly allies rather than rivals. But this is true only if the religion is "high," that is, enlightened and progressive. Nearly half of the space is devoted to categorical examination of objections to this position. The essay concludes by recommending that religion should be recognized as an important phase of human experience and should receive a broader and deeper treatment in our colleges than is now customary.

B. R. McElderry, Jr.

Outline of a Metaphysics. *The Absolute-Relative Theory*. By *Franklin J. Matchette*. Philosophical Library, New York, 1950. Pp. xiv-108. $3.75.

Mr. Matchette believes that every object in the world is a relative being, that it "points beyond itself—to a completion and fulfilment in the Absolute." The doctrine of this "Major Polarity" of the absolute and the relative is the foundation of Mr. Matchette's metaphysics. The relative is finite, limited, and imperfect; it is changeable in time and space. The absolute is infinite, timeless, nonspatial, eternal, and perfect. The absolute is the God of traditional religion. The relative is contingent; it requires the Necessary Being (the absolute), which is the first cause of the relative world. On the other hand, the absolute as a perfect being is the final cause, the goal and "ideal" of the relative world.

Matchette's cosmos consists of primordial particles which he calls "zero-atom-units." They bear a closer resemblance to Leibniz's "monads" than to the atoms of Democritus in that they are bearers of such potencies as energy, life, mind, and value. All phenomena are reducible to the interplay of these particles, whose diverse combinations lead to actualization of their potentialities. (52) At the lower stages of this development, mind is unobservable; here is the domain of determinist necessity. There exists also a "modal" point of development, at which mind becomes observable; here begins the domain of behavior by choice, of self-determination, *i.e.*, of free will. Actions are good or bad "according as they do or do not approach more closely to the Absolute." (83)

In these times of decline of philosophy when materialism and naturalism are rife, it is indeed a pleasure to see a man of business, who is not a professional student of philosophy, following the tradition of the great thinkers who put the doctrine of God as the cornerstone of their world conception. Moreover, he does not repeat their thoughts but expresses the results of his own thinking in a fresh and original manner. There are, of course, a number of shortcomings in his metaphysics: *e.g.*, the doctrine of free will requires a far more complex system of notions than are to be found in this treatise. But taking into account the brevity of this work, one is led to admire the many valuable thoughts which the author has expressed here. The reading of Mr. Matchette's book will delight every lover of metaphysics.

N. Lossky

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN. By *Stanley Matthew Daugert*. King's Crown Press, New York, 1950. Pp. viii-134. $2.25.

Veblen the economist is fairly well known, but Veblen the philosopher has not been widely discovered. The author attempts to elucidate "the very interesting and highly important problem of the genesis and growth of Veblen's critical and theoretical views in philosophical analysis and speculation." In undertaking this task which is difficult because Veblen did not define his philosophical viewpoints either well or clearly, the author deserves commendation. If he has achieved a limited measure of success in this deep-seated undertaking, he will have helped his readers to obtain an improved grasp of many of Veblen's distinctive concepts, such as, instinct of workmanship, the canon of pecuniary emulation, the canon of conspicuous consumption, the canon of conspicuous leisure.

This examination of Veblen's philosophy of life takes the reader back to such thinkers as Immanuel Kant, Herbert Spencer, Noah Porter, Edward Bellamy, Jacques Loeb, Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and others. Veblen wrote an essay on Kant's *Critique of Judgment* and prepared his doctoral dissertation at Yale on "Ethical Grounds of a Doctrine of Retribution."

Veblen apparently "identified Kant's faculty of the pure reflective judgment with inductive reasoning." He endeavored to extend this identification of reflective judgment with inductive reasoning beyond the field of ethical judgments to "true science, applicable in 'practical life.'" He viewed lightly the subject of final causes as far as every-day life is concerned. He thought highly of Peirce's concept of the "guiding principle" and claimed that "the principle of adaptation was the guiding principle of the reflective judgment," that is, of inductive reasoning. In the foregoing interpretations the author indicates "the source of much that is distinctive and characteristic" in Veblen's philosophy of economics.

The author believes that Veblen partially reconciles Kant's teleology with Spencer's evolutionism, and both of these with James's and Dewey's genetic psychology. He sums up some of Veblen's major ideas as follows: the human process, *i.e.*, human evolution, is a cumulative process of change in people's habits of thinking; these habits of thinking are directed toward specific ends; evolutionary economic theory is concerned chiefly "with the process of men's habits of thought as seen in their actions"; the settled habits of thought become institutions; and habituation does not change readily.

Veblen was not only an economist but a social psychologist. His social psychology was rooted in a theory of knowledge that has evolutionary bases, particularly of a cultural evolutionary nature, which in turn is affected by different economic activities in the different areas and ages of human life on earth. His social psychology was grounded in empiricism as a tool for study in a pluralistic world; it was also centered in a pragmatism that holds that "ideas are plans of action" and that "habits of thought are habits of action directed to ends."

The author has performed a difficult task well. If he is not always clear, he is as clear as Veblen's heavily constructed sentences will allow. He has presented Veblen in a more understandable light than this able but abstruse thinker has been previously seen.

EMORY S. BOGARDUS

THE WAYS OF GENIUS. By *Radoslav A. Tsanoff*. Harper & Bros., New York, 1949. Pp. xv-310. $3.50.

Both in folklore and in serious thought the ways of genius have long aroused much interest. This interest has not been due entirely to the wonder caused by the strange eccentricities and amazing accomplishments of brilliantly creative persons. The common man often discerns, in the habits and achievements of the great, certain characteristics of which there are at least occasional intimations in himself. Tsanoff fully recognizes the universal significance of his subject and gives it the broadest possible interpretation. "The purpose of *The Ways of Genius* is to investigate the creative activity of mind." (Preface)

Included in the study are musicians, artists, poets, scientists, jurists, reformers, prophets, and philosophers. For such an inclusive study the author is unusually well equipped. As philosopher he is well known, having produced important books in philosophy of religion and in ethics. His aesthetic interests are attested by his being a director of the Houston Symphony Society and a former trustee of the Museum of Fine Arts in Houston, Texas.

An especially attractive feature of the book is the concreteness and intimacy of illustration from the lives and works of genius in many ages. Such descriptive materials constitute a large portion of the study. If it offered no other compensation the reading would be made worth-while by all this inviting association with great personalities and cultural landmarks of history.

In probing for some explanation of the astonishing concentration of creative activity in certain minds and in certain moments of their careers, Tsanoff employs several approaches. He seeks to learn as much as possible from the autobiographical explanations by the geniuses themselves and from comparison of successive drafts of famous poems. He employs psychological techniques and theories for whatever they are worth, though he is understandably skeptical about the attempts of some psychologists, in the name of experimental science, to have their classes produce poetry on command under analytic scrutiny. Finally, he makes certain philosophical inferences.

It can hardly be said that this study has produced any strikingly new explanation of the nature or favorable conditions of creative activity. It is found that human creation is essentially new synthesis of old elements, "the poet is born," (266) that the creative process usually requires an inordinate quantity, or at least intensity, of hard work and that success comes with remarkable frequency at hours of relaxation after long periods of arduous effort have apparently failed completely. Tsanoff is not so naive as to conclude that intense effort followed by relaxation is the cause of creative synthesis. The obvious fact is that usually no such result occurs.

The creative act is acknowledged by the author to be a genuine novelty

produced by a mind asserting its own real freedom. This puts the act of genius beyond the reach of any explanation, if explanation must be of a kind satisfactory to the causal determinist. The evidence Tsanoff brings to the support of belief in man's significant creative freedom is to this reviewer's mind the most important contribution of the book.

Tsanoff infers from his data that theories of mechanism and materialism are plainly false, contradicting the possibility even of their own creation. Likewise inadequate is any subjective idealism which denies or belittles the role of the body and of material objects in man's creative achievement. The place both of matter and mind, of mechanism and freedom must be given due recognition. However, he does not defend an ultimate metaphysical dualism. Rather, he suggests that some recently discovered characteristics of the material universe "may strengthen the case of idealistic metaphysics." (288) Such problems he finally leaves open as leading beyond the bounds of his present inquiry.

His studies warrant "the recognition of a creative character in mental activity, especially at its highest levels," and "the acknowledgment of a unique self-enhancing, inexhaustible, and infinitely perfectible character of value." (288)

The Ways of Genius is written in a smooth and vivid style which, together with the rich contents and admirable format, make it a delight to own and read.

Boston University L. Harold DeWolf

Recovery of Man. By *F. R. Barry*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1949. Pp. viii-109. $2.00.

The threatened breakdown of "Christian" civilization finds its focus, not in the split atom, but in the shrinking stature of the personal in modern life. A civilization of spiritual dwarfs must revert to a low order of society, perhaps carnivorous anarchy, perhaps the ant-hill. Democracy, especially as it accepts increasing responsibilities of each for all and all for each, demands persons of a high order. Classical humanism as a western heritage has not been self-sustaining, nor are modern secularisms more adequate. Bishop Barry makes a strong and persuasive case for the thesis that only a view of man as a child of a personal God and destined for everlasting life can nurture men of sufficient stature to meet the present crisis. The church, he feels, should welcome every genuine personalistic ally, especially well-intentioned but inadequately grounded humanism, and accept fully the necessity of religious ideals being worked out in the dirty processes of politics and economics. Here is the witness of culturally conscious churchmanship of a high order offering, not specific panaceas, but raising a banner for those courageous to be fully men.

D. H. Rhoades

Existence and Being. By *Martin Heidegger*. Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1949. Pp. 399. $5.00.

In this volume which the publisher has entitled *Existence and Being*, Martin Heidegger who, for more than twenty years has been the most influential of German thinkers, is presented for the first time in English translation. Unfortunately, however, it is not his main work (*Sein und Zeit*) which has been

translated; rather it has been the four essays: "Hoelderlin and the Essence of Poetry" (1936); "Remembrance of the Poet" (1943), "On the Essence of Truth" (1943), and "What is Metaphysics?" (1943). The first two essays were translated by Douglas Scott; the last two by R. F. C. Hull and Alen Crick.

These four essays are contained in 137 pages while the entire volume contains 399 pages. Werner Brock, the well-known author of *An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy*, wrote two long explanatory introductions for this volume of Heidegger: "An Account of Being and Time" and "An account of the Four Essays." Each of these two introductions is almost as long as the original Heidegger text. This book, therefore, could probably be best characterized as an introduction to the philosophy of Heidegger with selected examples from his work. Two of these essays treat of the German poet Hoelderlin (1770-1843), one of the greatest of the German lyricists and one of the most thought-provoking personalities in German literature—a man who did not gain the recognition in Germany which he deserved until the last twenty-five years.

"What is Metaphysics?" is Heidegger's inaugural lecture when, in 1929, he was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau, a position which had been held up to that time by his teacher, Husserl. Later a "postscript" was added to this lecture. It is in this form that it appeared in 1943 and in which it is translated here. Both the translation and the interpretations are highly laudable endeavors, for "Existentialism" as Heidegger formulated it is not just a mode, it is one of the most serious philosophical undertakings of our time. It is not my purpose here, in conjunction with the reference to this useful book, to formulate Heidegger's problematicism in highly tractable phraseology. I only want to express myself against the fact that here too Heidegger's *Being and Time* is represented as a sort of preliminary activity. Twenty-three years ago Heidegger created and explained a kind of "philosophical anthropology." It was to be the introduction for a future ontology which has not yet appeared. On the other hand, the "philosophical anthropology" has exerted the strongest of influences upon the thinking and the thinkers of the last two decades. This "anthropology" has also been the starting point for Sartreism, no matter how much the adherents of Heidegger attempt to prove that his successor has nothing in common with his predecessor, except the term "existentialism."

Now the English-speaking world has the opportunity to study the source of one of the most influential tendencies of the twentieth century.

LUDWIG MARCUSE

BASIC ISSUES IN RELIGION

BASIC ISSUES IN CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. By *Albert C. Knudson*. Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, New York, 1950. Pp. 220. $2.75.

We have long contended that for simplicity of expression, as well as for clarity of thought, Albert C. Knudson leads the line of personalistic thinkers. His most recent book following so closely upon the reissue after twenty years of his *Philosophy of Personalism*, lends emphasis to the fact. *Basic Issues in Chris-*

tian Thought, though brief, has all the crispness and vigor of his earlier works and deals first hand with burning contemporary theological issues. Such a revolt from a frustrating and intolerable dogmatism in theology provides an analogy to the present break-up of dogmatism in science. In each case there is a movement away from sterile and fixed ideas toward a new appreciation of freedom. In the one, God is seen from the more Christian aspect as living, and in the other, immanent purpose is taking the place of materialistic determinism, offering for the first time a basis of reconciliation between religion and science.

But these changes are not uncontested. Tradition does not yield without a struggle. The newer ideas of contingency and relativity were laughed out of court at first and are only beginning to receive due recognition. With all the advances made necessary by rational thought, a certain type of scientist insists on giving new legs to the dismembered materialism of the past, though it be but a corpse. In like manner, there is a desperate effort in theology to save the outworn and discredited theologies of necessitarianism by appeal to the loyalties of "orthodoxy." The questions thus raised are here discussed by the ablest of modern theologians not in a way destructive of fundamental ideas but of their greater and more rational fulfilment. No true ones are sacrificed but they are given modern and stronger interpretation. In the face of the revival of theological authoritarianism, irrationalism, and negativism, Knudson shows plainly the legitimate demand of the soul for a faith that is rationally satisfying. It is not profitable to say with Barth that "the Bible is God's Word because it is," without being also, as the Epistle cites, "Ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you." A religion that has to check its brains at the door of the temple must, in the nature of the case, be precarious, feeding on a philosophical skepticism by which it must eventually perish.

One of the greatest chapters of the book is that on the personality of God and the freedom of man: "the two most fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith." Here the ancient superstition that personality implies corporeality, gives way under searching inquiry as to the genuine meaning of personality and its relation to freedom. In the personality of God and its possible incarnation in other personalities, lies the charter and justification for the existence and dignity of human personality. Through this concept the doctrine of the Trinity finds application in present affairs and becomes something more, to quote Dean Inge, than "an incomprehensible and manifestly self-contradictory piece of word juggling."

This work is not only great in its timeliness for an age of doubt, but for interpretations that are within the scope of the Gospel and within the understanding of the average reader.

R. T. F.

HINDU VIEW OF CHRIST. By *Swami Akhilananda*. Philosophical Library, New York, 1949. Pp. 291. $3.00.

The ten chapters which constitute this book are based upon extemporaneous lectures delivered by the head of the Ramakrishna Vedanta Society of Boston.

They are popular in style and do not make any attempt to turn into Christian dogmas regarding the Godhead. They are, of course, thoroughly appreciative in tone and irenic in spirit. Orthodox Christians of many varying shades should be able to read the chapters without too much defensiveness even though Akhilananda's incarnational doctrine is much broader than the traditional Christian one. In the process of interpreting as an Oriental and a yogi, the author reveals many phases of Hindu thought and draws extensively upon Hindu scriptures, especially the Bhagavad-Gita. This type of approach to the study of comparative religion has many things to commend it. It is to be hoped that westerners will develop an equally open approach to the teachings of India. There is no substitute for going to the Gita and the Upanishads.

I am not sure than many western readers will be helped by the fairly traditional interpretation of Jesus that emerges in these pages. The plowpoint of comparative religions will have to be set considerably deeper than it is in this study if those who have been alienated from orthodox symbols and interpretations in the west are going to come to grips with the profound insights which lie back of what is to them unilluminating language.

The west has much to learn from the east. That needs to be said even more emphatically than Akhilananda says it. It can be said in just as irenic a spirit as he has said it. This book deserves wide reading in traditional Christian circles. It is to be hoped that it is only a preface to similar studies that will raise the issues even more strikingly and in more contemporary language. The last chapter, on Christian missions, should be required reading for every foreign-missions study course in every church.

> The family of nations can establish harmony in spirit of divergent thought patterns and aesthetic sensibilities, if we know that other cultures produce men and women of integration and spiritual realization. As the Christian missionaries in India should remember that they are ambassadors of Christian culture to India, so would the Indians like to see the best manifestation of Christian culture in them. . . . The missionary activities of all religious groups in the future should be inspired to work for the common good of mankind, harmonious living, and the realization of God in individual ways with acceptance of other viewpoints as valid and true.

FLOYD H. ROSS

THE NEW RENAISSANCE OF THE SPIRIT. By *Vincent A. McCrossen*. Philosophical Library, New York, 1949. Pp. x-252. $3.00.

The chief contentions of the author, who is Professor of Modern Languages in Marietta College, are in brief: that a civilization is fundamentally of one or the other of two kinds, according to its ruling values as the "sensate," worldly ones, or on the contrary the "spiritual," other-worldly ones; that our present civilization, like that of ancient Rome, is essentially sensate, whereas the type of civilization represented by the Hebrew prophets, by Homer, Hesiod, and Aeschylus,

and best of all by the Christian Middle Ages, is spiritual; that the latter ages are "Dark Ages" only as measured in terms of sensate values, but that, conversely, the civilization of Rome was, and our present civilization is, a Dark Age as measured in terms of the values of the spirit; hence that what is called "The Renaissance" was a resurgence of the sensate values but a submergence of the spiritual ones; that the converse kind of renaissance is now acutely needed and is in process of occurring; that the civilization which will emerge will be one animated by the Christian love of God, so that justice, charity, and the other spiritual values will, both within nations and as between them, preponderate instead of the sensate values; and yet that the dawning new civilization will not reproduce the medieval one any more than contemporary civilization reproduces that of ancient Rome notwithstanding the sameness of their ruling values.

By "sensate"—or "materialistic" or "utilitarian" or "pagan"—values the author means the values "rooted in the here and now, in the getting, the having, and the enjoying. They look upon life as an end in itself." (14) Sensate living, he explains, is not limited to the slogan "eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die," but includes also "the highest aesthetic and cultural enjoyment for their own sake of the best which has been said and thought and conceived and drawn and written." But as long as the value "is rooted in the primacy of life and of the senses and is enjoyed solely for its own sake, it remains a sensate value." On the other hand, "when the result becomes the uplift of the individual, the ennobling and growth of his spirit, a bringing of him closer to God, it becomes a spiritual value." (15) Thus, for example, the enjoyment of great music or great painting can be either sensate or spiritual, though at this high level the sensate easily passes into the spiritual.

By a "spiritual" culture the author means more specifically one where "the prime tests of value are rooted in the supra- and ultra-mundane . . . in God, in the soul, the *psyche*, the *anima*, in heaven, in sanctity, in absolute truth and absolute standards of morality. They have stressed the primacy of the things of God, not those of men, the primacy of things unseen, not those seen." (19) From the standpoint of the spiritual as so conceived, the wisdom of the sensate world is folly, and *vice versa*.

The book has five chapters. In the first, the main contentions, as above, are set forth. In the second, various aspects of the transition period between a sensate and a spiritual civilization—*i.e.*, of "the parturition of a new world"—are discussed. The third, "Our Misplaced Faith," argues that the contemporary faith in the power of science—social, political and economic in addition to physical—to make a truly better world, is a delusion because the values thought of and aimed at are still the sensate rather than the spiritual. The fourth chapter discusses a variety of topics, including the diverse roles which the author conceives the various nations to be respectively playing in the new renaissance of the spirit; and the chaos which he believes will result from the effort of the revolting masses to universalize and equalize participation in the sensate values notwithstanding the incapacity of the many to experience the highest of these. The last chapter, "What to do," answers that "we must return to Christ and

live by His norms, we must build again a Christian civilization" (216); and in this, each must do what he can, however little this may be. The individual is "the leaven with which the whole shall be leavened." (214)

This book is well written, vigorous, uncompromising, and challenging. Unfortunately, adequate appraisal of its contents is not possible in a short review. A few words must suffice to indicate some of the lines criticism would have to take.

For one thing, too many questions are tacitly begged by the arbitrary manner, cited above, in which the author chooses to define "spiritual" values. In ordinary usage the values called spiritual are—as concerns dealings with one's fellow men—those of kindness, honesty, considerateness, justice, helpfulness, readiness to forgive and to judge charitably, and the like; and—in dealings with oneself—humility, self-discipline, courage, diligence, painstaking, and the serenity throughout the vicissitudes of life which comes with self-dedication to something one believes more important than the fortunes of one's person. Where these values actually govern life, there Utopia, or "the kingdom of heaven," actually exists on earth already. But although these values are declared and demanded by Christianity, it did not invent them and has no copyright on them; and the Catholic theology and eschatology, to which the author is committed, or even more broadly the Christian, are not premises necessary for acknowledgment of those values and for devotion to their pursuit. Other religions too have saints, mystics, prophets, and miracles. Indeed, more than one atheist, agnostic, freethinker, or contemporary Humanist in fact attempts to live by those values as earnestly and with the same degree of success as any Catholic or other Christian. The spiritual impulses, even if too often weak, are human just as genuinely as are their opposites.

Moreover, as the author himself acknowledges, the so-called sensate values are not in themselves evil. What is so is the selfishness which, in its pursuit of them, traverses justice or compassion; and lack of the self-discipline which would restrain within rational limits the gratification of one's sensual and other appetites, and would prevent them from taking command and starving out demands of one's make-up that are more distinctively human.

Again, in view of the fact that the nature of man's future life, if any, is a matter mostly of more or less vague and diverse belief rather than of definite and verifiable knowledge; and in view further of the crudeness or vagueness of the associated ideas of "heaven," "hell," "salvation," "eternity," etc., current among Christians; in view of all this, it is far from evident that life on earth has really no intrinsic value but is significant only as entrance examination for admission to an eventual paradise. That this is its sole or its essential significance is not a known fact but only a dogma, accepted by some, which may turn out true, or false.

These few words will indicate that one may well share the author's belief that the times urgently call for a recrudescence of the spiritual values, and may well share also his evident devotion to them, without the least need for this of hooking up those values to his particular theology and eschatology. For on the

one hand, some men devotedly strive for them with different, or even without any, theological beliefs; and on the other, the behavior of men towards their fellows in times such as the Middle Ages, that were most pervaded by the author's religious beliefs, was not noticeably more humane but perhaps even less so than it is today. This reviewer believes that the essential business of the religions of mankind is the education of the heart. How effectively they have performed the task is another and very debatable question.

C. J. Ducasse

Brown University

The Church's Ministry in Our Time. By *Henry Knox Sherrill.* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1949. Pp. viii-162. $2.00.

This book comprises the Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale for 1948. Bishop Sherrill discusses the spiritual state of the world and the church in his first two chapters and then goes on to discuss the resources of the Christian Church for facing the tasks of the present hour. He is conscious of the wholesale drift from organized religion as indicated both by the widespread decline in church-going and the collapse of Christian moral standards. He is aware that there is something incongruous about the church's preaching unity to the nations when they cannot set the example within their own fellowship. Yet he does not despair of the church. He asks for better quality of men in the ministry, more adequately staffed theological seminaries, more honest intellectual inquiry, and a more effective teaching ministry. With these the Christian Church might be able to make a renewed impact upon the spiritual problem of our time. The book deserves a wide reading in the Christian fellowship.

F. H. R.

The Great Awakening in Nova Scotia 1776-1809. By *Maurice W. Armstrong.* American Society of Church History, Hartford, 1948. Pp. x-141. $3.00.

From the standpoint of revivalism, *The Great Awakening in Nova Scotia* is a belated and miniature repetition of the colonial movement of the middle eighteenth century. There is the same pattern of struggling frontier churches, trying to succeed in the manner of the old, established community churchmanship, the same uninspired respectability, the same inroads into the Lord's vineyard by uncouth and fervent itinerant evangelists. By comparison with the colonial story, there is a dearth of giants and nothing comparable to the critical controversies of Edwards, Chauncey, *et al.* Only one figure, that of Henry Alline, emerges into considerable stature. Theologically incidental factors, such as immigrations of German stock and Loyalist refugees, play a noticeable part. In the space of a full generation, the ferment has all but ceased, the New Lights have been tamed by established orders and theologies (in large part Baptist), and "the Protestant Dissenters of Nova Scotia . . . [have] laid aside the wings of the spirit and settled down to orderly and unexciting growth." (138)

This small volume is a credit to the "Studies in Church History" series. Extensive original sources are brought to focus in a condensed and readable account. One may assume that Professor Armstrong's study will remain a standard reference for the foreseeable future.

D. H. R.

THE TIBETAN BOOK OF THE DEAD. By *W. Y. Evans-Wentz.* 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, New York, 1949. Pp. L-248. $5.25.

Evans-Wentz's translation of *The Tibetan Book of the Dead* comes with a new timeliness though it was first published in 1927, republished in 1936 and now appears in this revised edition. The timeliness consists in this that here we must discover if at all the inner genius of Tibetan civilization. This "hermit kingdom" is no longer a hidden Shangri-La but has been suddenly pitchforked by historic events into the very center of international interest. It may indeed contain within it possibilities of the utmost importance for the future.

The hour has arrived when if we are to live and act intelligently, it is necessary for us to understand the deep-lying motives of those strange and foreign civilizations which comprise the greater half of the world's population and with which we now have to deal. Isolation has given way under discoveries advanced by western society to immediateness of neighborhood. Problems can no longer be solved by ignorant self-assertion. The springs of a common life moreover are to be read only in a society's back-lying religion which provides the thought of the multitudes. We cannot meet the challenge of today without attention to these. Therefore, the sacred scriptures of Tibetan civilization become an essential source of contemporary knowledge. The Oxford University Press is to be congratulated in presenting this revised edition at this time.

R. T. F.

RITUAL MAGIC. By *E. M. Butler.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1949. Pp. x-329. $5.00.

Professor Butler, Schröder Professor of German in the University of Cambridge, has added a second book to her projected trilogy. The first, *The Myth of the Magus*, placed the sixteenth-century legend of Faust in its historical setting and concluded that it had its roots in ritual. In this volume the author has made a detailed study of the books of ceremonial ascribed to or used by the traditional magicians to see whether there can have sprung from the great magical rites, in more modern times, an art comparable to Greek mythological tragedy or to the medieval passion plays.

The author has limited the scope of her present study to a number of printed texts localized almost exclusively in Europe and concentrated in specimens of a quasi-modern nature. Part I deals with pre-Christian rites and ceremonies and is very brief. It includes chapters on the Akkadian inscriptions, the Greco-Egyptian magical papyri, poetical records of magic (from the

Epic of Gilgamesh, I Samuel 28, the Odyssey, etc.), and Jewish elements in magic, with a section on the Kabala. Part II deals with medieval and modern rites and ceremonies. Butler has included chapters on the Solomonic cycle, the disciples of "Solomon," the Faustian school and adepts, the art in England and exponents of the art. A chapter on the myth of "Satanism" brings this carefully written study to a conclusion. In a third volume Professor Butler will show how Goethe transformed the myth and broke the spell of Satanism in literature.

F. H. R.

A Free Man's Faith. By *D. Luther Evans.* Oxford University Press, New York, 1949. Pp. x-194. $3.00.

This book by a professor of philosophy at Ohio State University is especially well written, informative, and interesting. Here are the chapter headings: "Realities of Idealism," "With Wisdom and Understanding," "In the Divine Image," "Life at Its Best," "Heaven on Earth," and "Lord of All Being." In developing his own position of liberal Christian theism, Professor Evans steers between the two extremes of scientific humanism, which is really atheistic and overworks what its followers like to call creative intelligence, and neo-orthodoxy, which attempts to revive a revelational theology. In place of the scientific dogmatism of the former and the obvious obscurantism of the latter, the author recommends a modernized version of the logos doctrine which emphasizes the Christ of the fourth Gospel as being immanent in nature and as being transcendent in the realm of divinity.

Professor Evans is now probably less enthusiastic over his idea of a United Religious Organization similar to UNESCO—United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization—in the light of what has happened in Korea during the last few months. We are evidently caught in a revolutionary maelstrom from which a united religious organization is hardly likely to rescue us. While men need always to work for a common understanding among all who are motivated by good will, regardless of race, creed, or color, it must be recognized that there is in this mid-twentieth century world a strong trend toward destructiveness that will doubtless have to be met with superior force. Neverthless, Professor Evans has written an excellent philosophy of life for the thoughtful men and women of this our so turbulent age.

D. S. R.

A Commentary on the Creed of Islam, Translated with introduction and notes by Earl Edgar Elder. Columbia University Press, New York, 1950. Pp. xxxii-187. $3.75.

Students of comparative religion especially interested in Islam will be delighted with this new volume in the "Records of Civilization" series, put out under the auspices of the Department of History of Columbia University. The commentary referred to is that of Sa'd al-Din al-Taftazani (born A.D. 1322) who is still a celebrated authority in the schools of Islam. The creed is that of Najm

al-Din al-Nasafi (died 537 A.H.), a canon lawyer of the school of Abu Hanifa.

In the centuries following upon the death of the Prophet, Moslems were faced with many problems raised by Greek philosophy and Christian theology. The process of the formation of the Muslim creed has been traced by A. J. Wensinck. By the time of al-Nasafi, creed-making had gone through three stages, starting with the brief statements of the Qur'an and Traditions, proceeding through the phase of loosely connected sentences, to a third stage of logical arrangement and systematization. Al-Nasafi's statement of the Articles of Belief is one of the most noted of the many treatises. It is a standard textbook on Muslim theology, "a compendium of the various views regarding the great doctrines of Islam." His viewpoint is that of the orthodox Maturidites. The commentary of al-Taftazani, interestingly enough, reflects the perspective of a second orthodox school, that of the Ash'arites.

It remains to be seen whether in the decades immediately ahead, any of the modernist movements in Islam will be able to supplant the thoroughly entrenched traditionalism. In any event, to understand Islam one must understand it in its orthodox or conservative form. This volume is an important contribution to the furthering of that desirable end. The translator's introduction is well written and includes an excellent brief summary on eleven different items of the relative positions of the two schools of orthodoxy. The book is a real addition to the field of Islamic studies.

F. H. R.

GOD AND MEN. By *Herbert H. Farmer*. Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, New York, 1948. Pp. 203. $2.00.

The substance of these seven chapters was delivered as the Lyman Beecher Lectures at the Divinity School of Yale University in 1946 with the title "The Christian Message and the World of Persons." In his first chapter Dr. Farmer indicates the three conditions that must be fulfilled in presenting "the great verities of the Christian revelation." The massive unity and consistency of the Christian view must be made intelligible; the distinctiveness of the Christian view must be made plain; its radical and consistent personalism must be convincingly set forth. It is in his emphasis upon the world of persons and personal relationships that the author utilizes most fully the dynamic categories of contemporary thought. He does not oversimplify the problem of understanding the Christian message in its profounder reaches. Each man must bring to the study a serious mind, an alert attitude, a basic sincerity, and a spirit of adventure.

This is a well-reasoned statement of a mature religious perspective. If it does not meet the questions of many earnest seekers outside the traditional churches, it is not because of any lack of deep insight into the tremendous implications of interpersonal relationships, but rather because it reflects an all too typical Christian tendency to associate God's redemptive activity with one point in time—namely, the coming of Jesus. When Christians can recover one of the great, but ignored, insights of their own past—the co-eternity of

creation and redemption, fact and value, *esse* and *bene esse*—they will be in a position to make a much more persuasive case for the religious-personalistic interpretation of all experience. Dr. Farmer, and others like him, could assist in this task of freeing Christianity from its unfortunate "historicism." For as Dr. Farmer knows, persons grow—and are redeemed—only in the present, never in the past or the future. And as he himself admits, the channels of redemptive grace are as infinite as the ways of God with men. F. H. R.

FORGOTTEN RELIGIONS, A SYMPOSIUM, Edited by *Vergilius Ferm*. Philosophical Library, New York, 1950. Pp. xv-392. $7.50.

This is not the kind of book one reads through at one sitting. Its twenty-one chapters include contributions from experts in a wide variety of fields—social anthropology, ethnology, comparative religion, archeology, sociology, art, philosophy. The areas covered are: Dawn of Religions; Ancient Egyptian, Sumerian and Assyro-Babylonian Religion; Hittite Religion; Religion of the Canaanites; Prehistoric Greece as well as the Mystery Religions; The Inhabited World (on Alexander of Macedon); Mithraism; Manichaeism; Mazdakism; Old Norse Religion; Tibetan Religion; Shamanism; Religion of the Australian Aborigines, South American Indians, Eskimos, Navaho Indians and the Hopi Indians.

In his preface the editor has given an excellent statement of the purpose of the book: "to show something of the splendor, the glory and the grace of peoples who have preceded us and are now forgotten, together with some of those now living whose pathways are isolated from our own immediate traditions." He adds the hope that the book "may serve to overcome the patronizing mode of traditional historians and apologists who, when they look back and across to strange cultures, dismiss these ancient religions with the scornful remark that they are "heathen" and "pagan" and would see in them only a black contrast to the whiteness of a modern and lofty civilization." As Ferm points out, religions die for a variety of interrelated reasons, but the religious response does not. Even if priests be many and prophets few, man will continue trying to relate himself not only to his immediate environment but also to that larger universe of meaning of which he has intimations. These twenty-one chapters catch something of the depths of man's wonder as he has faced the mystery of life in widely separated places and times. Some of the essays are more technical and "tightly written" than others. Each includes valuable bibliographical references either in the footnotes or in separate lists.

F. H. R.

THE INTERPRETATION OF LITERATURE

THE REINTERPRETATION OF VICTORIAN LITERATURE. Edited by *Joseph E. Baker*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950. Pp. ix-236. $3.75.

Eleven American scholars, at eleven various institutions of higher learning, have contributed to this volume essays concerned with English literature of

the Victorian era. A more closely accurate title might have been given to the book for the contents do not provide "the" reinterpretation of all of Victorian literature; possibly some such title as *Invitation to Reinterpretation of Some Phases of Victorian Literature.* The preface declares the intent "to offer a frame or various frames, within which . . . other kinds of studies could be worked out with fresh perspective"; and says finally, that "No system has been imposed, no demands made or implied, save that each [contributor] should offer an invitation to further intellectual adventure whereby we can better appropriate to our use, enjoyment, and understanding the wealth of Victorian literature." The best way to indicate briefly the substance of the book is by listing the titles of its component parts (we should realize that for each title the meaning of the phrase "with references to Victorian literature" applies): Emery Neff, "Social Background and Social Thought"; Howard Mumford Jones, "The Comic Spirit and Victorian Sanity"; Charles Frederick Harrold, "The Oxford Movement: A Reconsideration"; Norman Foerster, "The Critical Study of the Victorian Age"; Bradford A. Booth, "Form and Technique in the Novel"; W. S. Knickerbocker, "Victorian Education and the Idea of Culture"; Richard A. E. Brooks, "The Development of the Historical Mind"; Frederick L. Mulhauser, "The Tradition of Burke"; Karl Litzenberg, "The Victorians and the World Abroad"; John W. Dodds, "New Territories in Victorian Biography"; Joseph E. Baker, "Our New Hellenic Renaissance."

All who have interest in the Victorian period will at once notice the absence of a treatment of poetry. Thereafter the lack of consideration of the literature of science might be wondered at, and of other categories such as the drama, the short story, the essay, the literature treating of fine arts, the literature of religion (it dealt with more than the Oxford Movement), the literature of travel, children's literature, etc. Though there are many incidental allusions to one or another of the omitted categories, poetry for instance, any treatment similar to that given the novel is lacking. Students of the Victorians will be informed and stimulated, however, by the book as it is, and grateful for it. Many of them will wish that an index had been provided.

The various contributions are uneven in substance and style, although of course to a considerable degree this is inevitable in a book compiled with such a plan and such freedom from editorial constraint. Differences appear: for instance, in angles of approach; degree of weightiness; attitudes toward annotation; amounts of indication of research done in a field; amounts of suggestion for new study; degrees of actual reinterpretation made. Certain overlappings, not always in complete agreement, occur. Despite its variations, overlappings, and omissions, however, the book is valuable in many ways. And it is creditably infused, by the efforts of all of the contributors, with a proper spirit of vigor, pleasure, and awareness of human and humane values—a spirit proper for these writings about a great period of English literature.

To the honor of this book the statement may be made that (1) in many ways it enlightens our minds and provides better perspective; (2) it suggests explicitly and implicitly, intentionally and (sometimes) unintentionally, a vast

number of topics for investigation—topics greatly varying in scope, range, depth, direction, and interest appeal; also, (3) it desirably whets our appetites for considerations, or reconsiderations, of other phases of Victorian literature, such as the drama, or poetry, that are not directly treated in this book. These three achievements make the book notably praiseworthy.

WILLIAM D. TEMPLEMAN

THE PERMANENCE OF YEATS. Edited by *James Hall* and *Martin Steinman*. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1950. Pp. x-414. $5.00.

W. B. Yeats is one of the great literary figures of our time. This is a well-justified and useful book about his work. It will do much to increase his fame and popularity, for it brings together, making easily accessible, twenty-four of the most thoughtful and stimulating studies and appreciations of Yeats that have appeared in print. By twenty-four different critics, these writings were first published in various periodicals and books, from 1931 to 1950. The editors' introduction (given a poor title) indicates some central problems and the range and extent of the treatment shown Yeats in the chosen articles. The articles, moreover, speak well for themselves. Though not similar in length, scope, or method of approach, having been written independently, they all show a serious awareness of the importance of Yeats's work, and of the value of critical study of it. Many notable British and American critics are represented, among them Wilson, Blackmur, Daiches, Brooks, Jeffares, Eliot, and Auden. One of the shrewdest critics is F. R. Leavis, and it seems a bit odd that the position given to the reprint of his comments should be such as to convey the impression that the editors wished to make it relatively inconspicuous. There is, regrettably, no stated or apparent plan of arrangement for the articles in the book.

This reviewer is glad to call attention to the valuable "Select Bibliography of Articles and Books, in Whole or in Part, on Yeats." (389-414) The book constitutes not only a recognition of Yeats but also a collection of material offering interest and enlightenment to all who are concerned with Yeats's work.

W. D. T.

JAMES JOYCE. By *W. Y. Tindall*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1950. Pp. ix-134. $2.00.

Mr. Tindall's study of Joyce is one in a series of books designed "to give the intelligent layman a basic understanding of those thinkers of the last hundred years who have most influenced the intellectual currents of our time." Studies of Darwin and Albert Einstein have already appeared, and books on Marx, Freud, Shaw, and others are in preparation.

The author has chosen to write for the "intelligent layman" familiar with some of Joyce's works. A fine introduction for the uninitiated already exists in Harry Levin's *James Joyce* (New Directions, 1941). By assuming familiarity with the works that preceded *Finnegan's Wake*, Mr. Tindall is able to devote considerable space to a discussion of the relation between Joyce's last novel

and the work that appeared before. He analyzes the method of the various works and traces the themes which occur and recur. Without being as detailed as the various keys to *Ulysses* and *Finnegan's Wake*, Mr. Tindall gives the reader help enough to start him on his own explorations of the symbols and the "new language" Joyce invented. But most important, the author imparts to the reader a sense of the richness and complexity of Joyce's mind, an awareness that the "difficulty" of Joyce results not from perversity or intellectual pride, but from an honest attempt to find a method adequate to the aesthetic ends he set for himself. The author also indicates how Joyce, in his use of myth, was in the stream of our time, not only in art, but in psychology and history as well.

The critic makes the greatest contribution when, because of his analysis, he enables the reader to return to the work in question with new anticipation and with more adequate expectations. Often what keeps us from appreciating much of the work termed "difficult" is a mistaken idea of what a work of art must do or what a particular work set out to do. We assume too readily that there is a "right" kind of art and that it is what we have grown accustomed to.

The dominant tradition in the novel has been what we roughly call realism. As readers we have accepted its assumptions about the nature of "reality" and the proper method and subject matter of fiction so that we no longer ask whether these assumptions are valid.

Like Eliot, Joyce is very much a man of the twentieth century, and is aware, as few artists have been, of the problems posed for the artist by the science and philosophy of our time. Both were forced to find new methods, even to use language differently from the way it had been used previously. Readers genuinely interested in the living literature will have to submit to a re-education in thinking and feeling before Joyce can communicate to them fully. For this re-education Mr. Tindall's book offers considerable help.

AEROL ARNOLD

SIXTEEN SELF SKETCHES. By *Bernard Shaw*. Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1949. Pp. 207. $3.50.

DAYS WITH BERNARD SHAW. By *Stephen Winsten*. Vanguard Press, New York, 1949. Pp. 327. $3.75.

As this is being written, George Bernard Shaw lies dead at 94 in his house at Ayot Saint Lawrence. During a man's lifetime criticism is always to some extent inhibited: there is always the chance that the next book will unexpectedly upset the nice tight evaluation and reduce the critical judgment to fatuity. The critic discusses the trees but the forest must to a great extent remain uncharted. When the artist dies his work remains as a static finality. There it is: nothing can be added now, and the critic can at last deal with the work as a whole.

Was Shaw a protein or an enzyme—was he a creator or a sort of ferment? Was he an artist-creator or an artist-teacher? Was he an original thinker or a

great and gifted expounder of the ideas of others? Was he the "bulldog" for Ibsen and Wagner, and (curiously enough) for Shakespeare—as Huxley said he had been "Darwin's bulldog"? What of the other sources of his ideas, enthusiasms and antipathies? To what degree was he profound and sensitive—and to what degree merely clever and skilful? What will he reveal of ultimate wisdom, when the satire and the topsy-turvyness and the concern with the transitory become dated? How great was he after all? We shall read much about him in the months to come, and final judgment will slowly take shape. But meanwhile we will find the world a duller place without the excitement of G.B.S. He has left his imprint upon us all: he gave us pleasure, and stimulation, and the will to question.

These two books add little that is new to the story of Shaw and his evolution as a man and an artist. His own *Sixteen Self Sketches* show him looking backward (not with nostalgia but with a sort of fascination) to his beginnings. We learn a little more about the Shaw family in its genteel Dublin poverty: the talented, desperate, tight-lipped mother; the vague, weak, and futile father; the blasphemous uncle and the very Irish sisters; the eternal music and talk; the portentous influence of George J. V. Lee (a sort of lesser Irish Svengali with charm); the childhood miseries of school; the clerkship and the final escape to England. In other sketches Shaw deals with his first authorship, his socialism and his religion, his education, his career as a music critic and orator, and his comments on the errors of past biographers of G.B.S. The book suggests that the old workman is tidying up his shop before leaving it: putting things in their places, sweeping up the chips and shavings, and pulling down the shades before he must go out and close the door behind him.

Mr. Winsten's book is the result of a neighborhood friendship with Shaw during his last years—a friendship that came as near to intimacy as Shaw permitted any man. Obviously Mr. Winsten made notes after the many conversations. While there is much here that is trivial or already known, many of Shaw's recorded remarks show him at his best. We hear again of Dublin and the beginnings in London, the evolution of the critic, speaker, novelist, and dramatist, and—to be brief—we listen to characteristic commentary on art, war, love, politics, and life in general. This is a decent and unpresuming book: it records the table talk of G.B.S. as set down by a reporter who is obviously proud and humble at having had the chance to know the great old man so closely during the last years of quiet harbor at Ayot Saint Lawrence.

F. C. Baxter

Hazlitt Painted by Himself. Presented by *Catherine Macdonald Maclean.* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1949. Pp. 152. $3.00.

It is difficult to see what type of reader will find this small volume genuinely useful. It is assumed that the reader will be familiar with Hazlitt, for no attempt is made to remind us of those triumphs in the familiar essay and in literary criticism which gave him importance. Some acquaintance with "The Feeling of Immortality in Youth," "The Flight," "The Spirit of the Age," "English

Poets," and "English Comic Writers," will certainly attract the reader to whatever autobiographical material can be collected from the twenty volumes of P. P. Howe's standard edition of Hazlitt. But how would the reader wish such material to be presented? Quite otherwise, we think, from the scheme Doctor Maclean has adopted.

Under eighteen chapter headings representing the general sequence of Hazlitt's chief interests, passages have been drawn from various works and combined in an unusual way: "It is not a literal transcript of Hazlitt's references to any of the themes touched on in the volume. . . . What I have tried to do rather is to extract from the many references to each of these themes the essence . . . and to give the flow of his feeling as closely as possible in his own words. . . ." That is to say, the text does not indicate where Hazlitt's text leaves off and Doctor Maclean's editorial transition begins. Notes at the end of the volume indicate page references of sources, but this still leaves an exasperating labor of collation for the reader who is curious as to the precise statements of Hazlitt, and their relation to context. The volume is thus of no use to the scholar. It is doubtful whether the general reader is any better served. The method of allowing Hazlitt to *appear* to be doing all the talking has minimized the editorial explanation which would be genuinely helpful to the person reading for general information or enjoyment. The brief chapters "De l'Amour" and "Sarah," for example, are so abstract that the reader will have to bring to them some of the knowledge of Hazlitt's love affairs which Doctor Maclean herself required a hundred pages to tell in her full-length biography of Hazlitt (*Born Under Saturn*, New York, 1944). A short life of Hazlitt, quoting liberally from his autobiographical passages, would be useful. It is a pity that Doctor Maclean did not undertake an abridged edition of her longer work instead of the present amorphous volume.

B. R. M.

THE OLD HOUSE AT COATE. By *Richard Jefferies*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1948. Pp. 215. $3.75.

One attribute of the English character that is basic and everywhere reflected in the literature of England is the love of nature. No other literature (including our own) has this characteristic delight in the simple phenomena of nature. A French poet of any epoch can make out with three stock trees and five flowers; a Russian novelist sees nature as a backdrop of black and white and gray; a German, Scandinavian, Italian, or American writer acknowledges nature as a necessity for setting or adornment. Nature is not in their blood, pervasively, as it is with Englishmen. Thoreau and Burroughs and Muir have much to do with nature, of course, but for most of us "Nature" seems to be a conscious hobby for the few.

From the "springtime note" of *The Cuckoo Song* and Chaucer's *Prologue* —and the trees and flowers of Shakespeare—to the work of the English romantics, to Ruskin, Hardy, Housman, and the durable parts of Kipling, this love of England's fitful skies and seasons, her birds and flowers, runs like a

bright thread through English writing. No other land could have produced *The Compleat Angler*, White's *Natural History of Selborne*, or for that matter *Precious Bane*, *Dream Days*, or even *The Private Papers of Henry Ryecroft*, as we have them.

Richard Jeffries, born in 1848 and dead in 1887, wrote many books that deal with the teeming life of England's meadows, rivers, lanes, and woods—with her skies and rains and winds. Jeffries is not to everyone's taste, of course. But any man who reads him (if he has any nostalgia at all for the gentle, simple, natural, eternal things) will fall under his spell.

In the book under review Mr. Looker has edited several unpublished essays, including the autobiographic *The Old House at Coate*. The book is difficult to review, for it has no theme and no plot, and consists of a familiar study of growing things, of birds, insects, and fish, all seen as a part of a vital nature. Jeffries, as always, makes interesting asides. Sometimes he startles the reader, as when he states that if man is ever to conquer the air it will be because he has studied the rigid-wing insects rather than the flexible-wing birds. The book shimmers on, poetically, beautifully, un-selfconsciously. It will make new devotees for the Jefferies cult.

The book is edited with skill, and contains wood engravings by Agnes Miller Parker.

F. C. B.

LITERATURE AND THEOLOGY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND. By *Kenneth B. Murdock*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1949. Pp. xv-235. $4.00.

The great period of religious literature in English was the seventeenth century. The aesthetically preferable sections of this literature were Anglican or Catholic. But a wholesome if somewhat astringent product bore a Puritan label.

To notable researches by Perry Miller and others in New England Puritanism is now added Professor Murdock's consideration of Puritan literary theory, its use in actual writing, and its relation to the basic thought of the sect. There is no attempt at formal literary history or at tracing theology through subtle ramifications.

The early New England Puritans thought of themselves as establishing God's people in a new land. They were mindful of the similarity of their course to that of the ancient Israelites. In their writing they dwelt upon the circumstances of their migration, both as a people and as individuals. In their thought they likened England to Egypt, the Atlantic to the Red Sea, New England to Canaan.

Their members, it was felt, must be constantly reminded, not only of their aggregate purpose, but of the imperative need of the individual to keep the faith, inform himself as fully as he might of the ways of Providence, and bring himself into a condition to be saved. The process would not be that of sudden conversion. It involved protracted and assiduous growth toward knowledge and godliness.

Puritan authors in New England, like those in the mother country, wrought

under grave handicaps. Because their purpose was to sustain and spread the true faith they must cleave to a spiritually utilitarian objective. Because beauty sought for its own sake was distracting if not sinful they must reject stylistic felicities not harnessed to moral ends. Because the sensuous might so easily degenerate to the sensual they must be on their guard against any intrusion of carnal appeal.

On the other hand, they had definite advantages. Their readers belonged to the middle classes who were just beginning to form some acquaintance with books. To be practically helpful a composition must be methodical and simple —a need which ministered, here as in England, to the rise of workaday prose. The instruction should also be vitalized; hence circumspect use might be made of personal experience (that the trials and triumphs of the holy might guide men seeking holiness), of homely illustrations from everyday circumstance, of secular learning, even of rhetorical devices.

All these things might be used, but only with caution, with consecrated purpose. The Puritan could cherish learning and poetry, but never for their own sakes. They must nourish him religiously; above all, they must not arouse pleasure, passion, or pride incompatible with religion. Colonial Puritan authors were usually clergymen or devout laymen. They were a superior class, men of education and taste. Doubtless in a holy sort of way they were sometimes irked by restrictions and longed to let go rather more freely. It is significant that Edward Taylor, best of New England poets, reached his greatest heights when he adopted the general manner of Donne the Anglican and Crashaw the Catholic. Perhaps the fear of having been betrayed or of undermining others led to his injunction that his poems should not be published.

All too quickly Puritanism ceased to be nonconformist and itself demanded conformity. Its theologians and writers, hand in glove though they were, could not permanently block new religious attitudes or fresh literary fashions. But through an abundance of sermons, histories, diaries, biographies, and autobiographies, with a sizable flock of stiff-winged poems, the earlier Puritan authors had effective impact upon worship and style. The merits of their compositions, taken as a body, were, if somewhat limited, nevertheless substantial. The influence upon subsequent letters, in individual cases less demonstrable than Mr. Murdock implies, has been extensive.

GARLAND GREEVER

THE OTHER CASANOVA. By *Paul Nettl.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1950. Pp. vii-293. $3.75.

The name Giacomo Casanova is synonymous, in the mind of the general public, with a dashing hero who made love to every pretty woman who crossed his path. It is something of a surprise, then, to find that this same man was curiously involved in the musical and theatrical world of the eighteenth century.

Dr. Paul Nettl has taken the journals, diaries, letters, and publications from

libraries all over Europe and combined those portions which make up a diverting account of the subject of his research. The book is, perhaps necessarily, episodic. It rambles literally all over the western world, picking up fascinating bits of information at each stop. The important names of the times, *i.e.*, composers, singers, dancers, etc., are prominent throughout the pages and Casanova knew them all. Through all of these people, the reader gets a glimpse of the cultural life of Italy, Germany, France, Belgium, England, and in the last chapter of the book, the United States (New York City).

The one facet of the large topic which is developed more fully is the association of Casanova with the librettist Da Ponte and the musician Mozart. This connection between the simple elegance of Mozart's music and the swashbuckling life of Casanova is little known. Da Ponte who did the libretto of *Don Giovanni* was a close and lifelong friend of Casanova. There is little doubt that something of Casanova's life went into the story. Thus Dr. Nettl ends his book with the words "A strange trinity: Mozart–Da Ponte–Casanova!"

W. M. Crittenden

English Poetry. By *Leone Vivante*. Faber and Faber, London, 1950. Pp. 340. 21s. net.

In the Summer 1948 number of *The Personalist* (page 316) there was included a review of *La Poesia Inglese* by Leone Vivante. It is to be noted that this scholarly Italian work on the relation between philosophy and English poetry is now available in English. It seems to this reviewer an important contribution to philosophy in its broader relationships as well as another link between English and Italian scholarship.

Merritt M. Thompson

The Bamboo Flower. By *Alfredo Q. González*. Dorrance & Co., Philadelphia. Pp. 204. $2.50.

It is fitting that the essay, somewhat neglected in this confused age, should be the medium for a Filipino who is fond of reminiscence and has widely explored letters and philosophy. Through training, experience, and temperament Dr. González is cosmopolitan. At the same time he is deeply attached to the local and the minute. Here his themes range from personal memories and the objects and appearances of nature to literary appreciation and the problems of good and evil. Among the rare instances of sharp adverse feeling is his reference to the Japanese as "an arrogant and crafty race." (97) His spirit is normally one of such gentleness and charity that his reader shares with him a whole series of "adventures in contentment."

G. G.

The Imagery of Keats and Shelley. By *Richard Harter Fogle*. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1949. Pp. x-296. $4.00.

This book is a protest against the reordering of the hierarchy of English poets which the new critics, in their confident way, have been putting into effect. This reordering has lowered the status of the romantic poets in general and

within the group of romantic poets has depressed Shelley and elevated Keats —as far as the guilt of his association with the others has permitted. Mr. Fogle's strategy has been to use their acceptance of Keats to force the readmission of Shelley to grace—by asking whether the accepted contrasts between the two poets are real and whether the real differences make one a good poet and the other a bad poet.

His choice of their imagery, which he defines broadly as analogy or comparison, as the basis of comparison is an obvious one. Except incidentally, he is not concerned with the experiential content of the imagery, as Miss Spurgeon was in her *Shakespeare's Imagery*, or with the structural ordering of the images, as the new critics are, but rather with the sensibility of the two poets. The three basic chapters deal with the sensory channels—visual, auditory, etc. —and with synesthetic and empathic imagery. For persons not hostile to Shelley the results are not surprising: sensory images are more frequent in Shelley than in Keats, Shelley is richer in motor and Keats in auditory, tactual, and organic imagery; these differences make empathy rare in Shelley; synesthetic imagery points in Keats to an intuitive sense of oneness and in Shelley to a conscious intellectual quest for oneness. A chapter on the concreteness of the imagery concludes that the relative abstractness of Shelley's "is symptomatic of a fundamental dualism in Shelley's conception of the relationship between mind and nature—a dualism all the more evident because of his continuous efforts to resolve it into unity." (239)

The last chapter, "Romantic Bards and Metaphysical Reviewers," rewritten from an article published in 1948, is a direct counterattack on the new critics— Hulme, Richards, Ransome, Tate, and Brooks. It argues, effectively, that their prime critical standards, irony and organic unity, so far from being absolute and a safeguard against critical relativism, are arbitrarily chosen and arbitrarily applied. They can find irony and organic unity wherever they choose to find them.

A person writing such a book as this must learn far less about the poets he studies than about the critical principles he is going to use, and most readers will find the chief value of this book in the excellent summaries of synthesia and empathy and the new criticism.

FRANCIS CHRISTIANSEN

Books Received

Origin of History as Metaphysic. By *Marjorie L. Burke.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1950. Pp. 61. $2.75.

The American Impact on Russia. By *Max M. Laserson.* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1950. Pp. ix-441. $5.00.

The Search for a Way of Life. By *E. E. Kresge.* Exposition Press, New York, 1950. Pp. xiv-434. $4.00.

Feelings and Emotions. Edited by *Martin L. Reymert.* McGraw-Hill Company, New York, 1950. Pp. xxiii-603. $6.50.

The Moral Life and the Ethical Life. By *Eliseo Vivas.* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950. Pp. xix-390. $6.00.

If This Be Religion. By *Frederick Keller Stamm.* John Day Company, New York, 1950. Pp. x-116. $1.75.

Matter and Memory. By *Henri Bergson.* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1950. Pp. xxiv-339. $2.75.

Goethe the Thinker. By *Karl Viëtor.* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1950. Pp. x-212. $4.00.

The Last Romantics. By *Graham Hough.* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1949. Pp. xix-284. $3.00.

Principles of General Psychopathology. By *Siegfried Fischer.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1950. Pp. xxi-327. $4.75.

The Dilemma of the Idealist. By *David Bryn-Jones.* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1950. Pp. xv-278. $3.00.

Methods of Inquiry. By *C. West Churchman* and *Russell L. Ackoff.* Educational Publishers, St. Louis, 1950. Pp. 558. $6.00.

Mark Twain as a Literary Artist. By *Gladys Carmen Bellamy.* University of Oklahoma, Norman, 1950. Pp. xiii-396. $5.00.

The "Why" of Man's Experience. By *Hadley Cantril.* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1950. Pp. xiii-198. $2.75.

Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. By *Walter A. Kaufman.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950. Pp. xi-409. $6.00.

The Clue to Christian Education. By *Randolph Crump Miller.* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1950. Pp. xi-211. $2.75.

The Kingdom Without End. By *Robert Elliot Fitch.* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1950. Pp. xiv-137. $2.50.

The Open Society and Its Enemies. By *Karl R. Popper.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950. Pp. xii-732. $7.50.

La Propagande Politique. Par *Jean-Marie Domenach.* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1950. Pp. 127.

Idea-Men of Today. By *Vincent Edward Smith.* Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1950. Pp. x-434. $5.00.

Biography of the Gods. By *A. Eustace Haydon.* 5th Reprint. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1948. Pp. xiii-352. $3.50.

AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By *Sir Arthur Keith.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1950. Pp. vi-721. $4.75.

DOCUMENTARY TEXTBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS. By *J. Eugene Harley.* 2nd Ed. Center for International Understanding, Los Angeles, 1950. Pp. xxvii-1470. $12.50.

THE BRETHREN OF THE COMMON LIFE. By *Albert Hyma.* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, 1950. Pp. 222. $3.50.

Célèbres Leçons et Fragments. Par *Jules Lagneau.* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1950. Pp. 322. 600 fr.

PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF CONFERENCE ON TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY. Edited by *Frederick P. Harris.* Western Reserve University, Cleveland, 1950. Pp. 92.

JERUSALEM BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS. American Zionist Council, New York, 1950.

CONSTANTINE AND THE CONVERSION OF EUROPE. By *A. H. M. Jones.* The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xiv-271. $2.00.

THE MUSICAL EXPERIENCE OF COMPOSER, PERFORMER, LISTENER. By *Roger Sessions.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950. Pp. 127. $2.50.

DANTE THE PHILOSOPHER. By *Étienne Gilson.* Sheed & Ward, New York, 1949. Pp. xii-338. $4.00.

ARISTOTLE'S CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS. Tr. by *Kurt von Fritz* and *Ernst Kapp.* Hafner Publishing Co., New York, 1950. Pp. xii-233. $1.25.

TIME AND FREE WILL. By *Henri Bergson.* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1950. Pp. xxvii-252. $2.75.

JOHN STUART MILL'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD. Edited by *Ernest Nagel.* Hafner Publishing Company, New York, 1950. Pp. l-461. $4.50.

CHRISTIAN LOVE. By *Paul E. Johnson.* Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, New York, 1951. Pp. 240. $3.00.

ESCHATOLOGY AND ETHICS IN THE TEACHING OF JESUS. By *Amos N. Wilder.* Harper & Brothers, New York, 1950. Pp. 223. $2.50.

MODERN PHILOSOPHERS—WESTERN THOUGHT SINCE KANT. By *Howard C. McElroy.* Russell F. Moore Co., New York, 1950. Pp. xii-268. $4.00.

THE SCHOLAR ADVENTURERS. By *Richard D. Altick.* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1950. Pp. viii-338. $5.00.

READINGS IN BUSINESS ETHICS. Edited by *Maurice Baum.* Wm. C. Brown Co., Dubuque, 1950. Pp. vii-209. $3.25.

De la Vraie et de la Fausse Conversion suive de la Querelle de l'Athéisme. Par *Léon Brunschvicg.* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1951. Pp. 264. 500 fr.

THE PLACE OF REASON IN ETHICS. By *Stephen Edelston Toulmin.* Cambridge University Press, New York, 1951. Pp. xiv-228. $3.25.

THE BELIEF IN PROGRESS. By *John Baillie.* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1951. Pp. viii-240. $2.75.

THE PENNSYLVANIA DUTCH. By *Fredric Klees.* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1950. Pp. ix-451. $5.00.

Amerikanische Philosophie. Von *Gustav E. Müller.* Zweite verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. Fr. Frommanns Verlag, Stuttgart, 1950. Pp. 336. DM 12.

THE PEOPLE OF GREAT RUSSIA. By *Geoffrey Gorer* and *John Rickman.* Chanticleer Press, New York, 1950. Pp. 236. $3.00.

PLOTINUS' SEARCH FOR THE GOOD. By *Joseph Katz.* King's Crown Press, New York, 1950. Pp. ix-106. $2.50.

THE BEATEN PATHS. By *George M. Hodgson.* Exposition Press, New York, 1950. Pp. 104. $2.75.

GÉRARD DE NERVAL 1808-1855, POET, TRAVELER, DREAMER. By *S. A. Rhodes.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1951. Pp. ix-416. $4.75.

THE PROLOGUES AND EPILOGUES OF JOHN DRYDEN. By *William Bradford Gardner.* For University of Texas by Columbia University Press, New York, 1951. Pp. xx-361. $4.50.

WALT WHITMAN LOOKS AT THE SCHOOLS. By *Florence Bernstein Freedman.* King's Crown Press, New York, 1950. Pp. xii-278. $3.50.

KIERKEGAARD THE MELANCHOLY DANE. By *H. V. Martin.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1950. Pp. 119. $3.00.

L'Utopie et les Utopies. Par *Raymond Ruyer.* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1950. Pp. 293. 600 fr.

Les Déterminismes et la Contingence. Par *Paul Césari.* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1950. Pp. xi-140. 240 fr.

WILLIAM JAMES: THE MESSAGE OF A MODERN MIND. By *Lloyd Morris.* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1950. Pp. ix-98. $2.00.

La Liberté de la Volonté Signification des Doctrines Classiques. Par *Henri Daudin.* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1950. Pp. 250. 600 fr.

THE HEBREW IMPACT ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION. Edited by *Dagobert D. Runes.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1951. Pp. xiv-922. $10.00.

A CRITIQUE OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM. By *C. E. M. Joad.* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950. Pp. 154. $2.75.

MAN IN HIS PRIDE. By *David Grene.* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950. Pp. xiii-231. $4.00.

LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY. By *Rudolf Carnap.* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950. Pp. xvii-607. $12.50.

FROM WEALTH TO WELFARE. By *Harry K. Girvetz.* Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1950. Pp. xiii-323. $5.00.

PHILOSOPHIES OF F. R. TENNANT AND JOHN DEWEY. By *J. Oliver Buswell, Jr.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1950. Pp. xvii-516. $6.00.

MAN AND THE STATE. By *Jacques Maritain.* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951. Pp. x-219. $3.50.

EARLY MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. By *George Bosworth Burch.* King's Crown Press, New York, 1951. Pp. viii-142. $2.25.

THE PRODIGAL CENTURY. By *Henry Pratt Fairchild.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1950. Pp. xvii-258. $3.75.

VERSUS: REFLECTIONS OF A SOCIOLOGIST. By *Henry Pratt Fairchild.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1950. Pp. xvii-203. $3.75.

THE PERSONALIST
Volume XXXII #3
1951